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“(…) Wake up world 
Wake up and stop sleeping 
Wake up Africa 
Wake up and stop blaming 







Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) put an end to the preferential non-reciprocal 
commercial treatment from the European Union (EU) to African Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries, in force since 1975 and until December 2007 (the deadline for EPAs 
deals). Negotiations are being challenging as only a small number of countries have 
closed full EPAs with EU by now, on the grounds that EPAs are missing their 
development goal. This dissertation intends to analyse EPAs negotiation round, evaluate 
to which extend the agreements are delivering on their promise to be pro-development 
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Os Acordos de Parceira Económica (APEs) encerram um período alargado de tratamento 
comercial preferencial e não-recíproco da União Europeia (UE) aos países de África, 
Caraíbas e Pacífico (ACP), vigente entre 1975 e Dezembro 2007 (data final para 
conclusão dos APEs). O processo negocial tem-se revelado difícil e apenas um reduzido 
número de países concluiu APEs totais à data, invocando que os referidos acordos 
descuram os objectivos de desenvolvimento a que se haviam proposto. Assim sendo, esta 
dissertação propõe-se analisar os processos de negociação em curso, avaliar em que 
medida os APEs constituem instrumentos que visam o desenvolvimento dos países ACP, 
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Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) end up with the preferential non-
reciprocal commercial treatment from the European Union (EU) to African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries, in force since 1975. The negotiation process started in 
September 2002 and aimed to be concluded by December 2007. However, only a small 
number of countries closed full deals by this time on grounds that EPAs are falling short 
of their development promise. Most ACP countries are trading with the EU on the basis of 
interim EPA agreements (IEPA). 
EPAs hold great importance to ACP countries as they propose a level of trade 
liberalisation these countries might not be prepared to face. The agreements under 
negotiation intend to open ACP countries’ markets to EU, putting ACP countries’ goods 
in direct competition with those imported from the EU. However, the differences of 
development and size among the two regions are notorious, reinforcing the argument that 
ACP countries aren’t prepared to withstand competition and the related harmful 
consequences for agriculture, industrial activity and employment. Implications at the 
fiscal revenue front are one of the issues to be addressed because of the constraints it 
might raise on public investment on health and education areas, but so are the 
implications for the ACP countries’ (already troubled) regional integration process. 
Furthermore EPAs negotiations are involving a wide scope of issues, which goes beyond 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) agenda. 
Taking into account all these elements, this dissertation intends to analyse EPAs in 
order to evaluate whether, or to which extend, these agreements are delivering on their 
development promise. It has also the purpose of assessing ways in which such delivery 
could be fostered. As such, the premise that is being tested is that EPAs are a pro-
development tool.  
In order to test it, this work will use information on the update and content of EPAs 
negotiations, academic literature produced on this topic but also research produced by 
several international organisations as well as the Non Governmental Organisations 
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(NGO). The major purpose is to analyse and list the arguments presented by the several 
parties involved and based on that information reach a conclusion. Given the difficulties 
in collecting significant and regular statistical data aggregating ACP countries, this 
dissertation works with ACP countries aggregated data when available, but in most cases 
it either works with the Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) group data or with statistics available 
for the African region. 
The dissertation is divided in two parts, each with two chapters. Chapter I looks 
into ACP countries’ competitive position, whilst Chapter II studies EPAs’ origin, scope 
and timetable to then analyse the implications these agreements portend for the African 
regional integration process. In the second part, Chapter III articulates EPAs negotiations 
with the WTO roundtable in order to access the implications the first might have on the 
second and Chapter IV analyses the relation between trade restrictiveness and 
development to then list the ways ACP countries should use to protect their interests on 


























ACP COUNTRIES’ COMPETITIVE POSITION 
 
ACP countries have benefited from preferential non-reciprocal trade treatment 
from EU since 1975 until December 2007, the deadline for Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) negotiations. This first Chapter identifies on Section 1 the major 
features that characterize ACP countries exports access to EU markets, which take 
expression on a reduction on custom duties and tariffs, but also on the prevalence of 
residual tariff barriers on sensitive products, of escalating custom duties, as well as on the 
significant climb on non tariff barriers respecting to sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
(SPS) and rules of origin (RoO) over recent years. It then focuses on the competition of 
imports in ACP countries’ domestic markets and the little room of manoeuvre ACP 
countries have to deal with unfair competition coming from Europe, as well as on strong 
reliance of ACP Governments on import tax revenue (Section 2). After addressing these 
issues, Section 3 makes a reflection upon the structural constraints faced by ACP 
countries, outlining the importance of infrastructures to the development of the region, in 
particular due to its impact on trading and transport costs. On this latter point it analyses a 
working paper from World Bank, which studies the major trend of trade restrictiveness 
and emphasises the need to lower tariffs and transport costs in Africa in order to make the 
region more competitive.  
 
1. Market Access of ACP Countries Exports to EU Markets 
 
Generally ACP countries exports benefit from preferential non-reciprocal treatment 
in regard to their access to developed countries’ markets. They have enjoyed from such 
facilities provided by EU, but other developed countries like Japan, the USA (United 
States of America) or Canada also hold Generalised System of Preferences (GPS) 
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schemes towards the developing world. Furthermore, ACP countries have also taken 
advantage of the reduction of custom duties, which gained a stronger speed after the entry 
into force of the WTO agriculture agreement, back in 1995.  
However, as Alpha et al. (2005:7-8) note, whilst it is possible to acknowledge the 
downward trend on customs duties over the past years, the move was not extendable to all 
products. Indeed so called sensitive products to the developed economies (a large part of 
which of great importance to ACP countries) have been excluded from GPS and, as a 
result, remain subject to high custom duties. The table below is quite elucidative how 
customs duties remained high for some products categories after the implementation of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, pointing to the need of further improvement of access to 
developed countries’ markets: 
 
Table 1: Custom Duties in EU, Japan and USA Before and After the 
Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
EU before EU after Japan before Japan after US before US after
Green Coffee 5 0 0 0 0 0
Cocoa 3 0 0 0 0 0
Fresh Tropical 
Products
9 5 17 4 7 5
Sugar 297 152 126 58 197 91
Wheat 170 82 240 152 6 4
Milky 
Products
289 178 489 326 144 93
 
Source: OCDE, MFN duties (cited in Alpha et al., 2005:8) 
 
The EU is the largest importer of agricultural products coming from the developing 
world, which in its total exceed the combined group of countries comprised by the USA, 
Canada, Japan and Australia. EU has indeed improved market access to the developing 
world over the past years. Since the WTO was created, the growth rate of agricultural 
exports from LDC to EU has doubled, an evolution that reflects to a large extent the 
launch of the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative back in 2001. In 2001 the EU 
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adopted the EBA initiative, which offers duty-free and quota-free access for LDC exports 




1.1. Residual Tariff Barriers over Exports 
 
Nonetheless, residual tariff barriers continue to be imposed over some agricultural 
products, namely those labelled as sensitive by EU, i.e. that threaten the competitiveness 
of EU products and ACP countries are no exception. According to Alpha et al (2005:10) 
“(…) the average level of residual tariff barriers applied to agricultural exports from 
ACP group (including LDCs) on the European market has been estimated at 5.3% on 
98.1% of imports receiving preferential treatment. This estimate must be compared with 
that of countries under GSP (17.9% of protection on average on 19.8% of imports 
covered by the preferences system) and MFN (average protection rate of 20.7%) 
regimes.” 
Residual tariff barriers can assume the form of ad valorem duties (a percentage of 
the product’s price) or specific duties (amount in euros per unit of measure, i.e. per 
100kg, per tonne, etc.). The Cotonou Agreement provided tax-free quotas, import ceilings 
and seasonal duties for some sensitive products coming from the ACP countries. This 
meant that up to a certain quota these agricultural products exported by ACP countries 
could face reduced or zero custom duties at the EU whilst benefiting from the higher and 
more stable European domestic price 
2
. The same agreement allowed ACP countries to 
call for the registration of new agricultural products for purposes of tax and quota 
exemption, though the approval license was usually hard to get. All in all, though ACP 
                                                          
1
. According to Oxfam (2000) the 48 LDC by the time of the launch of the initiative accounted for just 0.4% of 
World Trade, representing only 0,003% of EU imports. 
2
 These happened to be true for the product protocols of sugar, bovine meat and bananas existing under Lomé 




countries benefit from preferential treatment from EU the fact is that some of its exports 
still have to face residual tariff barriers. 
 
1.2. Escalating Custom Duties 
 
Another important theme for ACP countries exports refers to custom duties escalation, 
which translates into the imposition of higher levels of duties on products holding a 
higher degree of processing. Though the exports of processed products from ACP 
countries to the EU market are not taxed, this changes whenever each of the higher value 
added products involved contain EU sensitive products on their composition. This happen 
to be the case of fresh and dried mangos exports to EU, which are duty-free, contrary to 
mangos conserved with sugar or even mango juice, which turn to be taxed at €15 per 
100kg and €12.9 per 100kg, respectively
3
. LDCs are also taxed on tinned pineapples in 
the framework of access restrictions on sugar exports. The perpetuation of these 
escalating custom duties schemes is capping the development of ACP countries as 
confines them to primary products production specialisation, when there is wide 
consensus on the need of a migration towards the production of value added products 
(Alpha et al., 2005:11). 
 
1.3. The Importance of Non Tariff Barriers: Rules of Origin and SPS 
 
Trade relations between ACP countries and the developed world have been marked 
by a substantial reduction on the tariffs imposed by the advanced economies to their ACP 
counterparties, a trend which also extended to residual tariff barriers over the past years. 
Nonetheless, non tariff barriers respecting to sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) 
and rules of origin (RoO) have climbed significantly, growing the structural and capacity 
limitations faced by ACP countries and consequently hurting their exports’ 
                                                          
3
 PwC/GRET/Forum for Africa: Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreements. Phase 2. July 2005, cited in Alpha et al. (2005) 
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competitiveness (Alpha et al. 2005:7). Non-tariff barriers constitute a significant obstacle 
to ACP countries exports access to developed countries markets. 
 
1.3.1. Rules of Origin (RoO) 
 
RoO respect to aggregation rules and processing criteria a product must comply to 
get originating status. These are particularly important for countries whose exports are 
benefiting from preferential treatment. On those circumstances RoO are primarily 
intended to prevent trade deflection, i.e. preventing the country enjoying from lower 
tariffs from importing a certain product and re-exporting it at a profit; furthermore, it is 
intended to foster processing capacity in developing economies. However, when too 
demanding, RoO might be assessed as non tariff barriers. This is the case of LDC ACP 
countries, where the RoO of the EBA initiative are the same of the GSP and therefore 
stricter that those settled under the Cotonou agreement. The packaging of food exports 
might weight significantly in the cost of the final product, which if not complying with 
RoO it might be taxed, reducing therefore price competitiveness. Whilst it is important to 
prevent reexportation risks, RoO currently applied to LDC are too strict impeding these 
countries from benefiting from the EBA initiative.  
EU’s RoO were stricter when compared to the US, at least regarding the textile 
sector. The low-income African countries that benefit from preferential access for their 
apparel to both regions, in a much similar way, face up, however, far more demanding 
RoO rules at EU’s preferential scheme in comparison to US’s African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). Indeed, the EU required, either under EBA initiative or the 
previous Cotonou Agreement, that yearn is woven into fabric and then made-up into 
apparel in the same country or in a country qualifying for accumulation whereas AGOA 
concedes a Special Rule (SR) to LDC by which these can use fabric from any origin. 
More recently EU relaxed RoO on textiles putting it more in line with USA AGOA. The 
changes made on fish RoO were not that consensual, however (EBCAM, 2009:2-3).  
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On this front the World Bank (2008:15) refers to the working paper of Portugal – 
Perez (2007)
4
 which provides econometric evidence that easing RoO and accepting the 
use of fabric for any origin has bolstered apparel exports from the top seven beneficiaries 
of AGOA’s Special Rule by around 300%. The international organisation also reports a 
recent research paper by Cadot and de Melo (2007)
5
 which also points to the negative 
impact of current RoO on the trade preferences conceded by developed world to African 
economies.  
 
Figure 1: Apparel Exports of 22 Countries Benefiting from AGOA SR by 2004 
 
Source: Portugal-Perez (2007) (cited in World Bank 2008:29) 
 
                                                          
4
 Portugal-Perez, Alberto (2007), ―The Costs of RoO in Apparel: African Apparel Exports to the US and EU‖. 
University of Geneva, mimeo. 
5
 Cadot, Oliver, Jaime de Melo and Alberto Portugal-Perez, 2007, ―Rules of Origin for Preferential Trading 
Agreements: Implications for the ASEAN Free Trade Area of EU and US Experience”, Journal of Economic 
Integration, 22 (2), pp.288-319. 
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1.3.4. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) 
 
Product standards and technical specifications can lead to an increase of trade costs 
for exporters, who are forced to change production processes in order to comply with 
standard regulations of the importing country as well as take all the necessary steps to 
obtain the required certification. SPS can prove useful to the exporter, however, when 
providing valuable information about the consumer market in the importing country, 
reducing therefore information costs (World Bank 2008:7). Nonetheless, evidence seems 
to suggest that SPS are being used by some countries for protectionist purposes, resulting 
in numerous, complex and onerous SPS.  
According to Alpha et all (2005:13) SPS as an access condition to developed 
markets have increased from 300 in 1980 up to 3000 in 2000. The situation seems to be 
particularly shocking regarding European SPS which are, as a whole, more demanding 
that international SPS, posing therefore a challenge to ACP countries’ exports. A primary 
condition to access the European market is that agricultural exports do not exceed the 
Maximum Residual Limits (MRL) for pesticides authorised by the European Commission 
(imposed to the safeguard of human health). The application of a new European 
regulation on the control of foodstuffs on January, 1
st
 2006, proved even more demanding 
as despite being an internal EU regulation the Commission recognized it should be 
applied to third countries exporting to the European market.  
An important point here is that the new generalised regulation makes it compulsory 
for food companies to apply the Hazard Analysis Critical Points (HACCP) principles 
whilst the new European regulation also requires competent authorities of the exporting 
country to ensure that exporters comply with EU rules, meaning that such competent 
authority must have been recognised by the Commission’s services – the Food and 
Veterinary Office (FVO). For those more familiar with the reality of the developing world 
it is easy to understand how burdensome such a measure can be, given the institutional 
constraints at the public level related to the lack of resources and capabilities, which 
affect private initiative. 
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The World Bank (2008:7) cites a study from Otsuki et al. dated from 2001
6
 which 
after examining the impact of European aflatoxin standards on African groundnut exports 
concluded that a 10% rise in SPS restrictiveness is related to an 11% drop in trade. The 
international organization also quotes a study from Disdier et al. (2007
7
) which uses “(…) 
data on WTO notifications of mandatory sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as well as 
technical regulations, to measure the impact of standards across a large number of 
different sectors” where they conclude that “(…) standards are associated with negative 
trade impacts, in particular for exports from developing countries to OECD countries”.  
A study by Moenius (2004)
8
 concludes on the positive net impact of SPS on trade 
in the manufacturing sector, as it helps to mitigate information costs to the exporter. The 
same conclusion does not apply to the agricultural sectors, which deals with more 
homogeneous products, having therefore lower information costs. 
 
2. Import Competition in ACP Countries’ Domestic Markets 
 
ACP countries face competition from imports to their local production, either 
because these latter are more competitive in terms of productivity and comparative 
advantages or because of the dry up consumer markets for some products (European 
poultry exports to West and Central Africa is one of the examples). This kind of 
competition outlines the structural constraints face by ACP countries. 
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2.1. Unfair Competition: ACP Countries with Little Room of Manoeuvre 
 
Worrisome is when competition comes from distortion brought by aids to 
producers and exports which enable these to practice dumping prices i.e. sell below the 
production cost (often the example here goes to USA and EU wheat exports). This 
practice, more recurrent in the developed world (which owns the financial resources to 
undertake such measures), contribute to the destabilization of global markets, as they 
provide the incentive to overproduction as well as low, artificial and volatile prices. 
On the issue of subsidization to agriculture, Stiglitz (2006:85) notes that the 
subsidies of the USA, EU and Japan (and included hidden subsidies on water) al together 
account, at least for 75% of total income of SSA, leaving African farmers unable to 
compete in global markets. The average European cow receives a subsidy of US$2 per 
day, whilst in the developing world more than half the population lives on less than that. 
According to Oxfam (2008:17)
9
, Europe spent €50bn in support to farmers in 2006, a 
support ACP countries can not give has they do not own resources. “(…) Tariffs are one 
of the few instruments they can use to offer a degree of support to their farmers and 
struggling manufacturing sectors. Yet EPAs allow the use of subsidies and forbid the use 
of tariffs”. 
Distorted competition is unfair in nature, but particularly unfair for ACP countries 
which see themselves with little room of manoeuvre to provide the same support to 
domestic production and exports sectors, either because their Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP) don’t allow it or because the do not have the necessary financial 
resources. The framework of SAPs implied strong reductions in tariffs (in line with the 
liberal spirit that inspired the design of such programs) so by the time of 1995 agricultural 
agreement most countries were carrying regimes of very low tariffs. The reductions in 
tariffs for developing countries (LDC excluded) were in line with tariff lifts determined at 
the end of the Uruguay Round. Most ACP countries opted for a system of ceiling rates 
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then, which provided them with the flexibility to increase tariffs later. It is important to 
note, however, that tariffs remain, in most cases, well below the ceiling rates, so ACP 
countries should consider the possibility of running for more protectionist commercial 
policies (Alpha et al., 2005:15-16). 
The liberalization that EPAs portend for European exports entering ACP countries 
will make European products even more competitive than local products, having a direct 
impact on domestic industries as well as on people that directly or indirectly depending on 
it as a way of subsistence. This is why the definition of sensitive and special products to 
be excluded from liberalization as well as safeguard mechanisms assume such great 
importance at EPAs negotiations (this issue will be further developed on Chapter IV). 
Additionally, EPAs pose a threat to the regional trade as it could trigger trade diversion 
away from regional partners into EU imports. 
 
2.2. Dependence of Import Related Fiscal Revenues 
 
Related to weak institutions and bad governance practices (and to some extent it 
could be seen as a consequence of it) is the little level of economic diversification of ACP 
economies (many of them strongly relying on commodities trade) and also the high 
dependence of total fiscal revenue on import tariffs. The loss of fiscal revenue from 
import tariffs is one of the issues that is fuelling controversy on EPAs negotiations. 
EPAs impose budgetary constraints on ACP governments, as the latter lose an 
important source of fiscal revenues related to imports tariffs. These countries haven 
generally narrow existing domestic tax bases and fear losing significant tariff from 
eliminating tariffs on 80-85% of imports from the EU. A study from L. Hinkle et al. 
(2005, 207:271) estimates that in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) tariffs average 1% of GDP 
and around 7% to 10% of government total revenue. This already high dependence 
happens to be even higher for countries like Gambia and Cape Verde, whose tariffs 
account for up to 20% of their revenue. Furthermore, as EU products account for 40% of 
total imports in the region, the elimination of these tariffs has significant impact in public 
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revenue. Trade diversion from external to EU suppliers would increase even more the loss 
of tariff revenues. 
Estimates for these losses vary by region and according to the different studies, and 
can be expressive to some countries (5-10% of total revenues) and quite expressive to 
some others (10-15% of revenues). The author cited the study of Busse et al. (2004)
10
, 
which estimates losses of 19.8% of total government revenue in the case of Cape Verde, 
21.9% for Gambia and 10.7% for Senegal. In SADC, on the other hand, according to a 
UNECA (2004)
11
 study, revenue losses as a share of total government revenue would stay 
below 2.5%. 
 
Table 2: Revenue Loss as a Share of Total Government Revenue as a Result of EPAs 
 
                                                          
10
 Busse, M., A. Borrmann, and H.Grobmann, 2004, ―The Impact of ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreements on 
ECOWAS Countries: An Empirical Analysis of the Trade and Budget Effects‖. Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 
Hamburg. 
11
 UNECA, 2004, ―The EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement: A Regional Perspective.‖ Unpublished paper. 
Trade and Regional Integration Division, Addis Ababa. 
 
27 
Source: Hinkle et al. (2005:270). Compiled from UNECA (2005), Nielsen (2005), Busse 
et al. (2004), Kaningi e al. (2005), UNECA (2004), Khadelwal (2004); IMF IFS. 
 
2.2.1. Are Fiscal Revenue Losses Being Overplayed? 
 
There is a strong debate whether these studies overplay the revenue losses 
problem. L. Hinkle et al. (2005:272) believes this happens to be the case to some 
countries and proceeds noting the widespread practice on tariff exemptions grants in SSA, 
which if suppressed would cap revenue losses. The author cites the study of Busse, 
Borrmann and Grossman (2004)
12
 which concludes on low collection efficiency by noting 
that on average tariff collections are 70% or even lower of potential tariff revenues for 
ECOWAS countries and below 40% and 30% in Guinea-Bissau and Ghana respectively.  
A recent report by World Bank (2008d: 21-22) acknowledges that “(…) most of the 
analyses of revenue losses made prior to the initialling of interim had serious flaws and, 
as a consequence, significantly overstated the likely revenue losses to be expected from 
implementing interim EPA” and mentions the most recent estimates of Breton, Hoppe and 
Von Uexkull (2007)
13
 made for four African LDCs (Madagascar, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Zambia), which considers far more accurate. According to these authors the losses on 
revenues arising from eliminating tariffs on EU’s imports on those four countries ranges 
between 1% and 4% of total tax revenues, significantly below the numbers presented in 
the above table. They factored in tariff exemptions (which allowed to make the correction 
through statutory tariffs) as well as revenues from VAT and excise taxes on imports 
(which according to the study are responsible for 56%-71% of revenues from taxes in the 
four-country sample and increases as imports rise on the back of tariff cutting). 
Furthermore, the estimates assumed the elimination of tariffs on 100% of imports from 
the EU and not on 80%, making them reinforce the conservative nature of the study. 
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Table 3: Estimated revenue Losses from EPAs for Four COMESA Countries 
(assuming elimination of tariffs on all imports from EU) 
 
Source: Brenton, Hoppe and von Uexkull, 2007 (cited in World Bank, 2008d)  
 
Nonetheless, World Bank (2008d: 22) also reports the work of Baunsgaard and 
Keen (2005)
14
, which using a panel data for 111 countries over a period of 25 years 
concludes that high to middle income countries have been successful in replacing 
revenues lost due to tariff reductions whereas ―(…) revenue recovery has been extremely 
weak in low-income countries (which are those most dependent on trade tax revenues): 
they have recovered, at best, no more than about 30 cents on each lost dollar. Nor is there 
much evidence that the presence of a value-added tax has in itself made it easier to cope 
with the revenue effects of trade liberalization”.  
Despite noting the controversial nature of the revenue loss issue, the world 
international organization concludes that “(…) all countries desiring to integrate into the 
global trading system must sooner or later replace tariff revenues with increased 
domestic taxation”, making a clear call for domestic tax systems strengthening and 
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improved tax and customs administration. Furthermore, it emphasises that as elimination 
of tariffs “(…) will take place, in most cases, 10 to 15yrs from now, EPA-signatories will 
have a long period in which to strengthen their revenue systems in anticipation of these 
losses, which in most cases should be manageable”.  
Whilst there seems to be a consensus regarding the need to improve the 
functioning of the tax administration system, it is more doubtful whether increasing 
domestic taxation is reasonable for many of these economies, which already have to deal 
with high poverty incidence. Even if this is made there is no guarantee it will be able to 
compensate for the revenue loss on the back of tariff elimination. Furthermore, as it will 
be deeper developed on Chapter II, the elimination of tariffs negotiated on EPAs is not 
being as spread over the transition period as one would expect, not providing these 
economies with the necessary time for strengthen their revenue systems. 
 
3. ACP Countries Structural Constraints 
 
The reciprocal trade regime under the framework of EPA’s has several important 
implications to ACP countries, which gain greater importance in the context of the 
significant structural constraints these countries already face, which invariably translate 
into higher production costs, capping ACP countries’ competitiveness. Alpha et al. (2005: 
14) group these weaknesses in four: (i) insufficient public infrastructures (roads or 
railroads) which weigh on transportation costs and prove particularly harmful for fresh 
products trade (fish, fresh vegetables), portending risks for human health in the case of 
frozen products; (ii) feeble public utilities services, marked by shortcomings in water ad 
electricity which negatively affect the economy competitiveness; (iii) absence or little 
reliance of informatics systems, weak financial services, subdued investment and 
financing, low labour productivity (linked to the struggles on the health and education 
sectors we mentioned above); and (iv) institutional weaknesses related to corruption and 
bad governance practices. Stiglitz (2006:70) emphasises that developing countries (where 
ACP countries are included) “(…) not only lag in resources but also in technology; for 
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achieving sustained growth, closing the knowledge gap is more vital than improving 
efficiency or increasing available capital”.  
 
 Table 4: Comparison of Average Ranking of Major Developing 
Regions in Business Climate and Competitiveness indicator, 2007-2008 
 
Source:  Doing Business 2008 and the Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 (cited in Worl Bank, 
2008d) 
 
According to UNECA (2003) electricity and transport costs in Africa are seen by 
65% of surveyed businesses as restrictively high. Regional integration can play an 
important role in what regards to lowering electricity, transport and telecommunication 
costs, as in some regions markets are too small to realize full economies of scale in 
network services and their regulations. 
 
3.1. Infrastructure and Trading Costs in Africa 
 
In European markets, ACP countries face the fierce competition of Asian and Latin 
American countries, particularly on tropical products. According to a recent research 
released by the World Bank (2008:1), high costs of trade can cap a country’s trade 
performance, as producers face higher imported inputs prices and endure high cost on 
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final goods. According to the study ―African countries are among those having the 
highest trading costs in the world, and that for several types of costs”, a performance 
which is largely put to poor infra-structure and weak institutional bodies whilst the report 
in itself plays down the importance of tariff barriers, considered to be relatively low 
across all countries.  
In fact, when looking further into trading costs in Africa several other dimensions 
have to be taken into account, such as geography (15 landlocked countries in Africa
15
), 
the political stability, the infra-structural capability and institutional quality/development 
of those countries as well as of the neighbouring transit countries to targeted markets.  
 
Table 5: Transit Costs in Selected African Countries and World Groups, 
2001 
 
Source: UNECA (2003), compiled from UNCTAD data 
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Trade costs comprise all the costs incurred in supplying a final good to the end user 
and this includes from getting information about market conditions in the foreign market 
until the final payment is made. The definition is wide enough to include all the extra 
costs incurred in order to comply with the demands from the foreign market under target 
(which wouldn’t occur if the product was sold domestically), which means that RoO and 
SPS mentioned above should also be factored into as trade costs. 
World Bank (2008:3) cites an Anderson and Van Wincoop work dated from 2004
16
 
on trade costs sources which concludes on a rough 170% estimate (in terms of ad-valorem 
equivalent) of representative trade costs for industrialized countries, breakdowned as 
follows: 21% for transportation costs, 44% for border-related trade barriers and 55% for 
retail and wholesale distribution costs. 
 
3.1.1. Transport Costs  
 
African countries face much higher transport costs than the developed world as one 
can see from the figure below, which illustrates the costs of shipping a standard 40-foot 
container from Baltimore to several cities, based on information provided by international 
freight forwarders and their respective geographical distance. Inland transport for 
landlocked African countries weight on the costs structure; although the distance from 
Baltimore to the port city of Durban (South Africa) is pretty much the same as the 
distance to Mbabane (the capital of landlocked Swaziland), shipping costs to the latter are 
around 5 times higher than to the former city. 
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 (cited in World Bank, 2008:23) 
 
                                                          
17
 Busse, Mathias, 2003, ―Tariffs, Transport Costs and the WTO Doha Round: The Case of Developing Countries‖. 
The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy. Volume 4 Number 1,p. 15-31. 
 
34 
Table 6: Physical Integration in Selected Regional 
Economic Communities in Africa (2000) 
 
Source: UNECA (2003) 
 
3.1.2. Customs Procedures 
 
Simple and transparent procedures at custom administrations also translate into 
lower trade costs. A study from Djankov, Freund and Pham dated from 2006 concludes 
that ”(…) each day of delay at customs is equivalent to a country distancing itself from its 
trading partners by additional 85km”. It also has to be taken into account that this sort of 
delays also produces additional storage and wages costs. 
According to the World Bank 2008 Doing Business Report, Sub-Sahara Africa 
(SSA) is the region that demands for the highest number of export and import procedures, 
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Cost to import 
(US$ per 
container)
East Asia & 
Pacific
6.7 23.3 902.3 7.1 24.5 948.5
Eastern Europe 
& Central Asia
7.1 29.7 1,649.1 8.3 31.7 1,822.2
Latin America & 
Caribbean
6.9 19.7 1,229.8 7.4 22.3 1,384.3
Middle East & 
North Africa
6.5 23.3 1,024.4 7.6 26.7 1,204.8
OECD 4.5 10.7 1,069.1 5.1 11.4 1,132.7
South Asia 8.5 33.0 1,339.1 9.0 32.5 1,487.3
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
7.8 34.7 1,878.8 8.8 41.1 2,278.7
 
Source: Doing Business database (World Bank 2008b) 
 
3.2. Trade Restrictiveness Indices 
 
There is a variety of trade policy-related barriers that raise the cost of trading, from 
tariffs (ad valorem and specific), quotas, the combination of both in tariff-rate quotas, 
antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguard measures, non-automatic licensing, 
subsidies, among others. Trade restrictiveness takes the form of all them though it’s hard 
to get an index that comprises them all. There are two indexes that intend to measure 
trade restrictiveness developed by Kee, Olarreaga and Nicita (2006)
19
: the Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) and the Tariff Trade Restrictiveness Index (TTRI). 
According to World Bank (2008:5) they “(...) represent the ad valorem tariff which, if 
applied by an importing country to all imports, would result in a total import level 
equivalent to that prevailing under current policy settings”. 
The major difference between the two is whereas the OTRI gathers all the 
information on such policies provided by international organizations operating on the 
field (International Trade Centre (ITC), United Nations Conference  on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and WTO) – which include from ad valorem tariffs, to specific 
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duties as well as non-tariff measures in the form of price control measures, quantitative 
restrictions, monopolistic measures of technical regulations - the TTRI is confined to ad-
valorem and specific tariffs. OTRI’s scope is therefore wider, containing many of the 
issues that strangulate trade the most in nowadays, though it is criticized by some for 
measuring government restrictiveness and not protectionism, since it is hard to distinguish 
when non-tariff measures are driven by protectionism or instead if they have the purpose 
to safeguard human, animal or plant health. Even admitting such limitation, it seems 
pretty obvious that TTRI clearly underestimates the level of protection in the market. 
Furthermore, and according to World Bank (2008:5), non-tariff barriers contribute an 
additional 70% on average to the level of restrictiveness resulting from tariffs alone. 
 
3.2.1. Trade Restrictiveness Higher for Agricultural than Manufactured Goods 
 
The figure below shows that OTRI is on average twice as high for agricultural 
products as for manufactured goods, numbers which reinforce Stiglitz (2006:75) 
argument that restrictive trade policies have been focused on agricultural products (which 
also represent African countries key exports sector) as compared to manufactured goods. 
According to the author “trade negotiations led by the advanced industrial countries 
under the auspices of GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (…) focused 
on liberalization of trade in manufactured goods, the comparative advantage of the 
advanced industrial countries. There was limited trade liberalization in the areas 
important for developing countries, such as agriculture and textiles. Textiles remained 
subject to strong limits (quotas) on a country-by-country, product-by-product basis; 




Figure 3: OTRI for Agriculture and Manufactures 
 
Source: Kee et al. (cited in World Bank, 2008:23) 
 
When focusing our analysis on Agriculture it is interesting to see that Japan, 
followed by the EU are those holding the highest overall trade restrictiveness towards that 
sector; manufacturing, on the contrary, face the lowest restrictions. In face of such 
evidence, the world multilateral organisation has been wording increasing concerns 
towards unfair treatment against developing economies, as noted on a speech by its 
Director General Pascal Lamy: “(…) Trade opening and rule-making are indeed major 
goals of the WTO. But today a number of the current substantive rules of the WTO do 
perpetuate some bias against developing countries. This is true for example with rules on 
subsidies in agriculture that allow for trade-distorting subsidies which tends to favour 
developed countries. This is also true when we look at the high tariffs that many 
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Table 8: OTRI and TTRI (percent), for the Four Largest Traders, 2006 
 
Source: Global Monitoring Report (World Bank, 2008c) 
Note: TTRI in italics; OTRI in boldface font 
 
3.2.2. Developing Economies Facing and Imposing the Highest Protectionism 
 
OTRI also puts on evidence that low and middle income countries have been the 
ones facing and imposing highest levels of protection at the same time. The level of 
overall trade restrictiveness is, on average, higher for Middle East & North Africa, South 
Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean and Sub-Sahara Africa as opposed to two of the 
largest countries traders
21
, the US and EU.  
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Table 9: OTRI and TTRI (percent), by Developing Country Region, 2006 
 
Source: Global Monitoring Report (World Bank, 2008c) 
Note: TTRI in italics; OTRI in boldface font 
 
The figure presented below, extracted from 2008 Global Monitoring Report, points 
out that overall trade restrictiveness has been decreasing as result of unilateral reforms 
and trade negotiations. Within the 2000-2006 period East Asia and Latin America led the 
narrowing of overall trade restrictiveness whereas agriculture trade restrictiveness 




Figure 4: Change in Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI), 2000-2006 
 
Source: Global Monitoring Report (World Bank, 2008c) 
 
All in all, though acknowledging the importance of infrastructures on trade and 
development, the targeting of this issue should not be undertaken at the expense of fiscal 
revenue, which is essential to assure investment in education and heath sectors in 






ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS: CONCEPT AND 
EXTENSION 
 
The round of EPAs negotiations started in September 2002 and initially aimed to be 
concluded by December 2007. However, only a small number of countries closed full 
deals by this time, so most countries are trading with the EU on the grounds of interim 
EPA agreements (IEPA). This Chapter proposes itself to look into EPAs origin, assessing 
the factors and rational behind the concept, and also to investigate whether these 
agreements are to be considered inevitable (Section 1). It then focuses on the negotiation 
process as well as on the speed and size of the proposed trade liberalisation for ACP 
countries (Section 2). EPAs were flagged by the EU as a tool to foster ACP countries’ 
regional integration process and therefore this Chapter intends to evaluate to which 
extension this target is being met (Section 3).  
 
1. Economic Partnership Agreements: Origin and Scope 
 
The Economic Partnership Agreements are the commercial part of the Cotonou 
Agreement, signed in 2000, which replaced the several Lomé Conventions in force since 
1975. Under the Lomé Conventions ACP countries benefited from preferential non-
reciprocal commercial treatment from the EU, which means that the EU granted 
preferential access to exports from ACP countries in comparison to other countries 
without requiring identical preferential treatment over their exports to ACP members. 
However, this regime faced severe criticism all through the 90s because it was not 
complying with one of the rules imposed by WTO - the Most Favoured Nation Principle 
(MFNP). This means that the EU was pursuing discrimination in favour of ACP countries 
and against other countries. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement signed in 2000 called 
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for the modification of the trade regime, with the new trade regime to be implemented by 
2008 (Stevens, 2008: 211-212).  
 
1.1. Non Compliance with WTO’s Most Favoured Nation Principle 
 
According to the MFNP all trade advantages granted by one country to another one 
or a group of countries must, automatically, be extended to all WTO member states unless 
those trade preferences are reciprocal under the framework of a free trade area (FTA) or a 
customs union (XXIV article of the GATT agreement). Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
comprise an exception - they enjoy from a new Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
comprising the EBA initiative, which excludes them from compliance with the MFNP 
imposed by the WTO, meaning they are allowed to keep on benefiting from non-
reciprocal trade preferences.  
Furthermore, the XXIV article of the GATT agreement provides a rather vague 
definition of a customs union or FTA, stressing out that those agreements should 
comprise a substantial part of trade and extend over a reasonable period of time. A FTA 
“shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all 
the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories”.   
As the article is subject to different readings, the EU assumes that “substantially all 
trade” corresponds to 90% of all trade (free of customs duties and non-tariff barriers and 
no sector can be excluded on its whole) between the FTA members and the time horizon 
for FTA’s implementation extends up to 12 years. 
 
1.2. ACP Countries Trade Preferences Erosion 
 
EU preferential treatment to ACP exports was also censured for the low 
effectiveness of this type of commercial cooperation as a way to integrate ACP countries 
into world trade, as statistics pointed towards the maintenance of an inexpressive market 
share on international trade after several years of commercial cooperation. The access to a 
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special trade regime did not improve the position of ACP countries in world trade, even as 
the number of countries was enlarged; statistical data point instead to a deterioration. 
Alpha et al. (2005:11-12) note that when narrowing the scope of analysis towards Europe, 
the conclusion remains broadly unchanged, as over the last 20 years ACP countries 
market share in European imports has fallen from 8% down to 3%. The erosion of trade 
preferences of ACP countries worked, mostly, to the benefit of Asian countries, 
notwithstanding the fact that none of these countries has enjoyed from preferential trade 
treatment. According to the World Bank (2008:1) Africa’s market share on total world 
exports has fallen by around two thirds in the last three decades, passing from 2.9% in 
1976 to 0.9% in 2006. The numbers provided by WTO online data and compiled by 
UNECA (2008b) point to a slightly higher market share, of around 2,99% in 2006, but 
which still marks a noticeable downfall from the 5.98% high recorded back in the early 
80s. 
 
Figure 5: Africa’s Share of Total World Exports (%) 
 
Source: WTO online data (cited in UNECA, 2008b) 
 
Several factors lay behind ACP countries trade preferences erosion: (i) multilateral 
liberalization promoted by WTO, portending generalised tariffs reduction; (ii) the 
signature of bilateral free trade agreements between EU and other countries, also 
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introducing a reduction of tariffs (that was the case of fruits and vegetables with 
Mediterranean countries, for example); (iii) the reform of Common Agriculture Policy 
(CAP) in June 2003, levelling European prices off with world levels and as such 
penalising ACP countries which in most cases have benefited from this higher prices; (iv) 
the new GSP which comprises the EBA initiative for LDC. Also, the structural constraints 
ACP countries face, mentioned on Chapter I, which translate into higher production costs 
capping ACP countries’ competitiveness, do not allow these countries to follow the pace 
of growth of other developing economies like Asian, for instance. 
Many ACP countries will have many difficulties in coping with the liberalization 
Europe is pursuing at the multilateral and bilateral level, as EPAs are implemented. 
Oxfam (2008:20) calls attention to competition from other developing countries, which 
ACP countries won’t handle. “Through WTO talks, the EU is set to reduce its tariffs on 
tuna from 24 per cent to 7-8 per cent, which is likely to displace exports from Papua New 
Guinea in favour of Thailand and others; Malawi’s tobacco exporters stand to lose $3m 
to subsidised US exporters; Senegal and Mozambique will lose over $8m on prawns and 
fishery products as Argentina and Brazil increase their market shares; and Madagascar 
is set to lose out to Hong Kong, China, India and Tunisia in its garment and carpet 
sectors.”.  
 
1.3. EPA as Free Trade Agreements – an Inevitable Option? 
 
As a result of such criticism and after benefiting from two waives over the 
compliance with MFNP – one during the Lomé Convention IV-bis (1995-2000) and 
another over the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2007) – but with the commitment of not 
asking for a third dispensation, the EU initiated the reform of its commercial regime 
towards non-LDC ACP countries. 
EPA’s were designed as FTA between a region of ACP countries and the EU, 
introducing therefore the principle of reciprocity on trade relations, though the level of 
such reciprocity might be asymmetric, portending a lower degree of trade liberalization 
for ACP countries as compared to EU.  
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It is important to mention Oxfam (2008:6) call on this issue, as according to the 
Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) the option for a FTA was more a choice than a 
need, emphasising that EU could have opted for unilateral preferences for trade in goods, 
as the WTO admits the possibility of developed countries opening their markets to 
developing countries without reciprocity when in face on major differentiation between 
developing countries “(...) based on objective and transparent development criteria”. 
EPAs are not compulsory for the LDC ACP countries, which might opt for the alternative 
of the new GSP (EBA). The GSP has three levels of tariff: the standard applied to all ACP 
countries apart from LDC; the EBA covering LDC; and the GSP+ regime which only 
covers those countries that applied during 2005 (but to which no ACP country applied) 
(Stevens, 2008:213). 
Oxfam (2008:6) notes that EU intentions to turn these trade agreements into pro-
development tools for ACP countries were misguided and that instead these could 
compromise the latter development process as they cap their flexibility to use policies of 
their choice (chapter IV will tackle these issues). EU’s proposal consisted of classic free 
trade agreements texts, much similar to EU bilateral agreements with Chile and Mexico, 
which do not take into consideration ACP countries regional differences. The NGO cites a 
study from Boeut (2007)
22
 which states that ACP countries will actually be worse off, as 
“(...) under EPAs, European meat exports to most ACP countries were predicted to shoot 
up by 180%, while every other country grouping measured would see its exports decline 
by 30%”. 
While assumed in theory it is interesting to look further into ongoing negotiations 
and the content of EPA’s final agreements to access the level of asymmetry on the trade 
relations between the two ―partners,‖. It is also intended to see whether EPA’s agreements 
are strictly complying with WTO rules or if they are going beyond what is required by the 
multilateral organisation, what, if actually happening, might compromise ACP countries 
                                                          
22
 A.Boeut (2007) ―Searching for an Alternative to EPAs‖, IFPRI, Research Brief Number 10, December 2007. 
Powerpoint presentation, Evian meeting, December 2007. 
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negotiation capabilities and tools in the context of an increasingly globalized world. 
Chapter III will address these issues. 
 
2. EPA’s Timetable and Negotiations Update 
 
The round of negotiations carried out between the EU and ACP countries to forge 
EPA’s started in September 2002 and initially aimed to be concluded by December 2007. 
Due to fundamental differences in position and capacity constraints only a few number of 
countries was able to close full EPA agreements by this time - 15 CARIFORUM 
members comprising a full regional EPA
23
 out of a total of 76 countries (ECDPM, 
2007/2008: 22-23). Criticism grew towards EU unrealistic timetables, the wide scope of 
issues under negotiation
24
 and the related negative social consequences, but still the 2007 
deadline was maintained, under EU’s threat to raise tariffs over the imports of the ACP 
non-LDC that did not signed an EPA (or an interim EPA) by then. Signed agreements are 
now entering the ratification phase by the EU as well as national parliaments, and while 
this is not completed, the IEPAs are applied provisionally. 
Negotiations were supposed to be carried out with a group of countries and not 
countries individually. Each country had to choose the regional zone which best served its 
interests. Six regional blocks were initially involved in EPA’s negotiations with the EU: 
Central Africa (CEMAC), West Africa, Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC), East and Southern Africa (ESA), Caribbean and Pacific, which cut across 
ongoing regional integration efforts. Nonetheless, the majority of countries refused to 
close any deal and only those holding a weaker position – 18 countries and two Pacific 
countries – decided to initiate deals by December 2007, which in practice gave body to a 
rising number of bilateral agreements, negotiated within a short period of time. In the 
second half of 2007 five countries of the EAC (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
                                                          
23
 On December 16
th
 2007, 15 Caribbean countries (mostly non-LDCs) concluded a full regional EPA with the EU. 
24
 The Caribbean full EPA deal covers trade in goods but also trade in services as well as other areas such as 
investment, competition, government procurement and intellectual property. 
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Uganda) announced they would like to negotiate as a new region, what would take place 
on December, combining members of ESA and SADC-minus (Stevens, 2008:215). EAC 
countries participate in ESA meetings though they hold separate negotiations with the EC 
in parallel. 
Over 2008 negotiations towards comprehensive regional EPAs have been carried 
out in all regions, in accordance with the rendez-vous clauses contained in IEPAs. These 
clauses refer mostly to trade in services and trade related issues and the deadline was for 
them to be concluded by the end of 2008 (except for the agreements with ESA and EAC, 
which did not had a timeframe), but evidence seems to point towards an extension of 
discussion well into 2009 (EBCAM, 2008:1-4). 
 
2.1. EPA’s: Liberalising How Far, How Fast? 
 
Ongoing negotiations involve important issues such as the list of products that might 
be excluded from EPA’s negotiations, timetables and the development component EPA’s 
should integrate (ECDPM, 2006b: 1-3). EU intends the final EPA’s agreements to be 
gradually applied so that by 2020 trade liberalization might be completed. (ECDPM, 
2007/2008: 22-23).  
At the time of writing this dissertation, most countries were trading with the EU on 
the grounds of interim agreements (covering mainly goods), as full EPAs were still under 
negotiation. The EU wants all 35 ACP countries that initialled deals to sign them by July 
2009, but the odds of this happening are small. Furthermore, over 2008 and 2009 all 76 
ACP countries are expected to have full EPA negotiations completed. Beware that 
initialled EPA deals are not legally binding, so up until the full EPA is agreed, ACP 
countries can still put the issues of their interest to debate (Oxfam 2008: 9).  
 In what regards to the size of liberalisation in ACP countries, the EC (European 
Commission) has been more cautious, but as one can see from the table presented below 
the liberalization scheduled in interim EPA (IEPA) as of December 2007 was at an 
average of 80% by the end of the transition period (which in the bulk of the cases extends 
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to 2022/23). Mozambique and Papua New Guinea detach themselves for agreeing on the 
fasted liberalization schedules, to be concluded as soon as 2008.  
 
Table 10: Liberalisation Schedules Agreed in initialled Interim EPA Agreements 
Country 2008 2010 2012 2013 2015 2017 2018 2022 2023 2033 Total
v. 24,0% 37,0% 78,0% 81,5% 81,5%
t. 9,0% 22,0% 62,0% 80,0% 80,0%
v. 88,1% 88,1%
t. 82,1% 82,1%
v. 64,0% 80,0% 82,0% 82,0%
t. 74,0%
v. 21,5% 80,6% 80,6%
t.
v. 37,0% 80,7% 80,7%
t.
v. 24,5% 53,6% 95,6% 95,6%
t. 26,0% 73,0% 96,6% 96,6%
v. 62,0% 77,0% 97,5% 97,5%
t.














v. 69,8% 80,8% 80,8%
t. 83,9% 88,7% 88,7%
v. 62,2% 80,5% 80,5%
t. 72,8% 80,0% 80,0%
v. 50,0%
t.
v. 52,8% 56,0% 61,1% 82,7% 86,9%
t.
Caribbean
v: cumulative value of imports from the EU, to be liberalised by the specific year. t: cumulative percentage of tariff lines, to be liberalised by the specified year















Source: ECDPM (2007/2008: 22) 
 
This means that ACP countries have only around 20% for protection of products 
from competition of European exports, what, as Oxfam (2006:4) notes, “(…) would 
effectively squeeze ACP governments into choosing between maintaining tariffs on 
valuable revenue-raising imports such as cars and electronics; protecting staple food 
such as maize; exempting a few existing industries from competition; or securing the 
ability to support future industrial development”. These latter tools represent a key role 




Figure 6: Pace and scope of import liberalisation in EPAs (deals initialled in 
December 2007) 
 
Note: EAC is the East African Community comprising Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and 
Tanzania; SACU is the Southern African Customs Union. To date, four SACU members 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) have submitted a common liberalisation 
schedule. 
Source: Oxfam (2008:15) 
 
Though the willingness of negotiate full EPAs have been shown by actors, the truth 
is that negotiations are extending over time so interim agreements might be applied over a 
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longer period than was initially expected and some authors even admit the possibility that 
these become permanent.  
 
3. EPAs: a Deadlock to ACP Regional Integration Process? 
 
Soon EPAs were dropping one of the pro-developments goals they had flagged 
when first announced - promote regional integration among ACP countries. This latter has 
assumed a key role in the Cotonou Agreement and in ACP countries’ development 
strategies. Advantages associated with regional integration are well known, triggering the 
creation of custom unions, FTA and even monetary unions around the globe. Wider 
markets, economies of scale, increases in trade and investment, better diversification and 
a migration towards the production of higher value added products, trading with a wider 
and higher number of trading partners are just some of the benefits related to regionalism.  
 
3.1. Constraints to African Regional Integration Process 
 
However, as Ferreira (2005:65) points out, and in what regards to regional 
integration in Africa, the process assumed more an expression of economic cooperation 
rather than a real regional market integration, as the economic theory of integration 
portends. In fact, not only did Africa’s importance on international trade has diminished 
(as already put on evidence before), but the share of intra-regional trade within African 
regional organizations has also been kept at low levels, recording, according to UNECA 




Table 11: Africa’s Intra-Africa and Multilateral Trade, 1994-2000 
 
Source: UNECA (2003) 
 
Whilst acknowledging that EPAs represent a deadlock to African countries regional 
integration, it is important to bear in mind that the African regional integration process in 
itself has met little progress since a wave of independences crossed the continent, back in 
the 60s. Obstacles to regional economic integration in Africa are numerous, holding an 
economic, political, social, cultural and even historical nature.  
Aggregating contributions from different authors, Ferreira (2005: 74-76) 
comprehensively lists the major constraints to the African regional economic integration 
process as follows: a) lack of trade complementarities among partners; b) reduced market 
dimension and low production base diversification; c) poor infrastructure and transports 
capacities; d) high transport costs; e) high border trade costs; f) States’ budget strong 
dependence on customs revenues; g) meagre private economic sector; h) overlapping 
membership of regional organizations; i) non-compliance with customs preferences 
schemes and adoption of protectionist policies; j) difficulties in conciliating economic and 
commercial liberalization policies, under the spirit of the integration agreements, with the 
measures adopted under the Structural and Adjustment Programmes (PAE); l) unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits; m) difficulties in coordinating economic policies given 
material differences in the economic structure of member countries; n) problems related 
to the lack of coordination of the tools of economic policy; o) gaps on industrial 
development levels and on the capacity to promote it, which lead to polarisation in intra-
regional trade; p) small political will in promoting sound regional institutions; q) political 
instability; r) non respect of the rule of law) political conflicts amongst the States; t) 
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hurdles in the work out of economic and politic systems; u) high donors’ dependence; v) 
foreign countries’ dominance over access to markets; x) unrealistic calendars. 
 
Figure 7: African Countries Overlapping Membership in Regional 
Economic Communities (number of countries) 
 
Source: UNECA (2003) 
 
3.2. Large Differences of Tariffs among ACP Regional Blocks Negotiating EPAs 
 
Widening back the scope of analysis towards ACP countries, the implementation of 
a common external tariff (CET) proves difficult because of the large differences in 
applied tariffs among the regional blocks negotiating EPAs. A L. Hinkle et al. (2005:269) 
study points out that average tariffs in the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) region 
show the highest heterogeneity, ranging from 4.6% in Madagascar to more than 20% in 
Burundi, Seychelles and Sudan, whilst the ECOWAS region tariffs are more 




Table 12: Tariffs in ACP countries by EPAs Constellations 
 
Source: L. Hinkle et al. (2005:270). Compiled from UNSD COMTRADE and UNCRAD TRAINS data 
for most recent years available, expect as follows. Data for Djibouti, Fiji, Guinea, Rwanda, and the 




Differences at the structure of the tariffs protecting different categories of goods are 
also a point which complicates the implementation of a CET, as the latter portends 
convergence both at tariff average size and structure levels. 
 
3.3. Full Regional EPAs Replaced by Bilateral EPAs? 
 
The way EPAs are being negotiated should hinder intra-ACP trade. As no consensus 
is being reached on a regional basis and with EU forcing tight deadlines, regional EPAs 
are being replaced by bilateral EPAs, with all the negative consequences this portends to 
the regional integration movement. Oxfam (2008:7-8) cites the bilateral EPA agreements 
of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, in West Africa, which were quickly urged by EU after West 
African ministers called for a two-year extension of the negotiation period for a regional 
EPA deal in October 2007. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire the new text for a bilateral 
agreement was agreed within a two week period, without being subject to national or 
regional consultation and even key officials in Trade Ministry were left out of the 
consultation process, not to mention the country’s stakeholders (farmers, workers, 
business groups) directly affected by it. Regional markets should open to EU exports once 
they have a reasonable level of consolidation, for the sake of regional integration. 
EPAs negotiations are also hindering regional integration efforts at another level, as 
they force ACP countries to choose the block through which they want to negotiate. As 
mentioned above, overlapping membership is recurrent among African countries, so 
EPAs negotiations are forcing the break of regional groups. The Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) trade protocol is quite illustrative of such splintering, 
as six of its members opted to negotiate EPAs through Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) 
Group, the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) opted for the Central Africa Group, 
whilst South Africa decided not to negotiate an EPA, as the country benefits from a free 
trade agreement with the EU – the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement 




Figure 8: Splintering the SADC Region 
 
Source: Oxfam (2006:8) 
 
Nevertheless, one of the topics that is gaining visibility refers to the harmonisation 
of the EPA process with regional integration initiatives at the ACP, which emphasises that 
after individual IEPAs have been initialled, the actors are now involved in concluding full 
regional agreements (EBCAM, 2008:2). This rhetoric intends to mitigate the risks that 
EPAs pose to the regional integration process, but it remains to be seen how successful 
the completion of regional EPAs will be. 
 
3.4. EPAs Agreements: Heterogeneity as a Ruling Word  
 
The lack of harmonisation of liberalisation schedules that is being carried out, also 
due to many of the reasons stated above (heterogeneity of countries, State’s strong 
dependence on tariff revenues, little diversified production base,…), should raise intra-
regional trade barriers once the FTAs are on place. As countries opt for protecting 
different products and sectors from competition, the way to impede trade deflection is to 
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reinforce time-consuming and costly border controls as well as stricter rules of origin, 
weakening therefore intra-regional trade. The same applies to the LDCs that choose to be 
out of the EPAs (and they have strong incentive on that), which will have to raise barriers 
against their neighbours in order to protect their markets (for these countries supporting 
costs with border control is far more burdensome). Oxfam (2006:9) notes that “Intra-
regional integration needs to be allowed to proceed at its own internally driven pace, not 
according to imposed, arbitrary timetables and progress targets, as the EC is currently 
attempting to do”. 
Heterogeneity is the best word to describe African EPAs, as only one region, East 
African Community (EAC), has more than one country sharing the same commitments. 
The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is also no exception on 
this matter, as Oxfam (2008:18) points out: “(…) five countries have initialled the “EAC 
text” and have the same tariff schedules; another five have initialled a separate “ESA 
text” and each with different schedules; while six remaining countries have chosen to stay 
with Everything But Arms. This poses severe problems for the creation of a common 
external tariff.” Both ESA and EAC initialled IEPAs with the EC, though in the case of 
the first it referred to separate market access offers but a common text, and negotiations 
towards a full agreement, for each of the regions is taking place. According to EBCAM 
(2008:4), an ESA-EU interim agreement should be signed by the end of April 2009 and 
impending issues on the negotiation of a full EPA refer to provisions on trade in goods, 
trade in services, trade related issues as well as development support in line with a 
development matrix compiled in the region. EAC-EU negotiations regarding a full EPA 
also involve issues to be addressed, like the imposition of a duty or export tax in 
emergency cases, the MFN clause, technical barriers to trade, development cooperation, 
trade related issues and trade in services. 
West Africa knows significant different liberalisation schemes among its country 
members currently negotiating EPAs (Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana initialled IEPAs provide 
evidence on this) (ECDPM, 2008/2009). Negotiations for a full regional EPA proceed and 
intend to be concluded by June 2009. The elaboration of a list of sensitive products and 
the adoption of ECOWAS CET are progressing, despite resistance, and provisions on 
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trade in goods are about to be completed. Issues that still need to be addressed refer to 
RoO, trade in services and trade related issues. Furthermore, the region is elaborating an 
EPA development programme (PAPED) which intends to cover the development needs 
that result from an EPA (EBCAM, 2008:2-3). 
 
Figure 9: Regional Disintegration in Africa?: “Initialled” Trade Regimes 
 
Source: Oxfam (2008:18) 
 
In Central Africa only Cameroon initialled an interim agreement and negotiations 
towards a full regional EPA proceed. “(…) Outstanding issues include the Central 
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African regional market access offer in goods, trade in services as well as development 
support in line with a Joint Orientation Document (JOD) on reinforcing production 
capacities and increasing economic competitiveness” (EBCAM, 2008:2). 
In SADC, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland (BLNS) and Mozambique 
initialled an interim agreement. South Africa did not join the agreement, notwithstanding 
the fact that it forms a custom union (SACU) with BLNS countries. An interim agreement 
was expected to be signed by the end of 2008 but it happened to be postponed because of 
the need to discuss internally (within the region) ways to move forward on outstanding 
market access offers on goods as well as on contentious issues in the IEPA text which 
could limit the use of trade policy to foster economic and human development, develop 
local service sectors and facilitate domestic regulation of service sectors. BLS countries 
are willing to sign the IEPA and move towards a regional EPA, but South Africa (coupled 
with Angola and Namibia) make it conditional on changes to the text. South Africa and 
The friction between EC and South Africa is growing, as the first indicated that EU 
intends to sign an IEPA with SADC states even if South Africa is left out, what, in 
practice, would lead to two trades regimes operating within SACU, something that clearly 
clashes with EU intention of fostering regional integration through EPAs. In what regards 
to negotiations on a full EPA, issues on trade in services and investment provisions 
remain to be addressed (EBCAM, 2008:3-4). 
Caribbean countries have been the only able to negotiate a regional EPA with EU so 
far, but they are also having legal problems, because Caribbean Forum of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM), which is initialising the EPAs it is not a 
legal entity and its membership does not match Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the 
regional common market (Oxfam, 2008:18). Still, the EPA is being applied provisionally 
during the process of ratification by the European Parliament and the Caribbean and EU 
national parliaments. Haiti did not sign an EPA. In what refers to EPA implementation, 
CARIFORUM is preparing an EPA Implementation Road Map and a number of member 
states is setting up national implementation units. It has not yet been decided which 
organisation will be in charge of coordinating the implementation of EPA at the regional 
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level but needs of EPA support are being studied, in line with the development provisions 
in the regional EPA text (EBCAM, 2008:4-5). 
In Pacific Papua New Guinea and Fiji initialled IEPAs with the EU and negotiations 
towards a comprehensive regional EPA are taking place. The full EPA text is focused on 
trade in goods, fisheries and development cooperation. The region opted for a rendez-
vous clause to negotiate trades in services later on. 
An important step on African regional integration process was undertaken in 
October 2008, when three REC that account for a total of 26 countries, namely, EAC, 
SADC and COMESA decided to work towards a merger and task force is already 
working to establish a FTA, whose study will be submitted to the Tripartite Council of 
























ACP COUNTRIES AT THE WTO: THE IMPLICATIONS OF EPAs 
 
This Chapter calls attention to the fact that ACP countries are involved in a number of 
negotiation processes and how demanding this reality is for a region with marked 
shortage of human and technical capabilities (Section 1). In particular, it narrows the 
scope of analysis towards the negotiation process that is taking place under the WTO, in 
order to assess the links and potentials implications for EPAs (Sections 2 and 3). It then 
focuses on development assistance and its importance for EPAs; in particular researches 
into the potential articulation of EPAs and Aid for Trade (AfT), looking further into EU’s 
Aft strategy (Section 4). 
 
1. ACP Countries Involved in a Number of Negotiations Roundtables – Are they 
Prepared? 
 
ACP countries are involved in two important negotiations roundtables for their 
trade and agricultural policies– those of a multilateral basis at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) level and bilateral negotiations with the European Union (EU) under 
the score of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), the primary focus of this 
dissertation. Apart from this, ACP countries also have to deal with their own regional 
integration processes, which in the case of African countries, as seen in the Chapter II, 
assumes a rather complex nature, facing significant constraints. Managing so many 
negotiations processes demands high human and technical capabilities, areas in which 





, which are further weighed down by the perpetuation of the brain 
drain phenomena. 
 
1.1. EU and ACP Countries: Unequal Partners 
  
EPAs have been criticized for representing a negotiation process conducted between 
two very unequal partners. Working throughout World Bank’s economic statistics Oxfam 
(2006:2) produced the table shown below, which illustrates the asymmetric nature of 
EPAs negotiations, with ACP countries total GDP accounting for only 3,2% of EU’s 
$13,300 billion GDP in 2005. This means that EU 2005 GDP was 31 times higher than 
ACP countries’ total GDP, with the ratio jumping up to 1,414 times if narrowing the 
scope of our analysis towards the Pacific Islands. The discrepancies in the sizes of these 
two regions have a direct impact over respective bargaining power in EPA negotiations, 
especially because, as seen on Chapter II, what was expected to be regional agreements 
for FTA gave room to bilateral agreements between the EU and individual ACP countries. 
 
                                                          
25
 A poor health sector and related poor health conditions are reflected in high work absenteeism, particularly in SSA 
countries, which ultimately affects the competitiveness of the economy. As Stiglitz (2006:66) points out “Countries 
often hope that trade agreements will boost foreign investment and create jobs. But when companies make 
investment decisions they look at many factors, including the quality of the workforce, infrastructure, location, and 
political and social stability”. 
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Table 13: Unequal Partners in Trade 
 
Source: World Bank 2005 (cited in Oxfam, 2006: 3) 
 
1.2. Negotiations Pace: EPA’s Moving Faster than WTO’s  
 
The observation of undergoing WTO and EPA’s negotiations, suggests a far more 
flexible timetable at the multilateral forum in comparison to ACP countries/EU (bilateral 
or regional) agreements, as multilateral negotiations have faced several deadlocks so far, 
whilst the EU, on the contrary, is speeding up negotiations to an unprecedented level, 
insisting in more rigid and tight deadlines whilst accepting interim agreements as a 
transitional phase (Alpha et al., 2005: 5-7). Because EPA’s are advancing more quickly 
than WTO negotiations, the scope of some of the few final agreements signed could 
weaken ACP countries position in multilateral negotiations.  
 
1.3. Asymmetric Enforcement at WTO  
 
EPAs are being urged by the WTO, as this multilateral organisation is on charge of 
defining and overseeing the rules of the game of trade worldwide and therefore of each 
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trade agreements that falls under its umbrella. According to WTO Aid for Trade fact sheet 
“(...)WTO is a global trade body, and it has a clear role and responsibility for ensuring 
that countries can effectively participate in – and benefit from – world trade”. 
Nonetheless, it has to be noted that the WTO trade rules result from bargaining between 
rich and poor countries and the WTO does not directly guarantees their enforcement. 
What the international organization allows is for injured countries to retaliate and impose 
trade restrictions over the offender country. As Stiglitz (2006:76) notes, in practice, this 
translates into “asymmetric enforcement” as the size of a country can ultimately 
determine the impact of its retaliation, and as such its bargaining power.  
 
2. WTO Agenda – Evolving on Which Direction? 
 
Since 2000, ACP countries have participated in the renegotiation of the agricultural 
agreement, implemented in 1995, in the quality of WTO members. These negotiations, 
undergoing under the Doha Development Agenda, involve the three principal pillars of 
the agricultural agreement: improving market access by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers; control over the use of domestic supports to farmers in order to avoid markets 
distortions; and disciplines towards the use of exports’ supports. They constitute 
important tools for the guard of ACP countries’ interests in terms of trade and agricultural 
policies and as such, as Alpha et al. (2005: 5) note, their articulation with the ongoing 
EPA’s negotiations is a must. 
 
2.1. Trade Liberalization Moving Into Services and Intellectual Property Rights 
 
It’s not only agricultural issues that call for ACP countries full attention at the 
multilateral forum, though the sector does play an important role on those economies. 
Indeed, Stiglitz (2006:75-77) points out that the ongoing negotiations at the multilateral 
level are introducing news issues for debate, mostly of the interest of the developed 
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world. The author acknowledges that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)
26
 was focused on reducing tariffs on manufactured goods, the comparative 
advantage of developed economies by then. The agreement which would replace GATT 
on April 15
th
, 1994 – the WTO
27
 - expanded the scope of trade agreements to areas like 
services
28
 and intellectual property rights, the current comparative advantage of advanced 
economies. Services, which were not included in the agenda by the time of the GATT 
trade negotiations, represent now “(…) over 70% of America’s economy and nearly that 
in Europe and Japan” whilst manufacturing accounts only for 11% of American 
employment and output. 
The negotiations that preceded WTO launch - the Uruguay Round - were known as 
the ―Great Bargain‖, and held the promise, by the developed world, to liberalize trade and 
textiles and in turn developing countries would accept and comply with new rules on 
services, property rights and investments. Developed countries promise felt short of 
expectations, textiles quotas lasted for a decade and agricultural subsidies remain a 
practice, which led to WTO Director General Pascal growing criticism towards such 
measures, voicing the need to turn agriculture trade fairer to developing economies. 
Stiglitz (2006:78) writes on the asymmetries resulting from the Uruguay Round, noting 
that “(…) sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region with an average income of just $500 
per capita per year, lost some $1.2 billion a year” and noting that “seventy percent of the 
gains went to the developed countries – some $350 billion annually”, with the remaining 
30% of the benefits mostly ripped by middle-income economies like Brazil. 
                                                          
26
 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was formed in 1947 to lead trade negotiations. After the 
World War II, the Bretton Woods Conference introduced the idea of creating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to enhance financial stability but also establish an organization to regulate trade, the International Trade Organization 
(ITO), as part of a larger plan to bolster the economic recovery. The USA rejected this latter proposal in 1950, so 
once this failed only the GATT agreement was left. 45 years would have to pass before the WTO would come into 
effect. 
27
 The Uruguay Round negotiations began in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986, and were concluded by 
the signature of an agreement in Marrakech on April 15
th
, 1994, which would give body to the WTO, with 149 
member states against 128 member countries of GATT by the replacement time. 
28
 Comprises the liberalisation of skilled labour services, the comparative advantage of advanced economies, instead 
of unskilled labour services, which would work to the benefit of the developing world. 
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A work of Wade dated from 2003 alerts to the risks international regulations pose to 
the development policy options of developing countries. According to Wade (2003:1), 
Uruguay Round agreements on investment measures (TRIMS), on trade in services 
(GATS) and on intellectual property rights (TRIPS) are harmful for developing countries 
interests; the first two because they limit government’s power exercise over companies 
already operating or with prospects of operating in their country whilst the third proposes 
a strong defence of foreign companies’ property rights against thievery by domestic firms. 
“(…) Together the agreements make comprehensively illegal many of the industrial 
policy instruments used in the successful East Asian developers to nurture their own 
firms, industries and technological capacities. They are likely to lock in the position of 
western countries at the top of the world hierarchy of wealth” (this latter issue will be 
more deeply developed on Chapter IV). 
 
2.2. Doha Development Round Fails to Deliver Its Promise 
 
 In face of developing world discontentment towards the ―Great Bargain‖, another 
round of negotiations took place in 2001 - the Doha round in Qatar - aimed at introducing 
development issues at the centre of discussion. But it would take just two years before 
negotiations stalled, as developed countries kept on subsidizing their agriculture sector 
whilst demanding great liberalization efforts from developing countries. The Hong Kong 
meeting back in December 2005 didn’t make much progress on the development round 
either, nor did the meetings that followed suit, corroborating Stiglitz (2006:81) view that 
“(…) the scale of reforms is so low that it is likely to matter little” to developing 
countries.  
 
3. Could EPAs Undermine ACP Countries’ Position in Multilateral Negotiations? 
 
ACP countries account for approximately 50% of all WTO membership. Therefore 
the bilateral agreements under negotiation with the EU should weight in the multilateral 
trading system, turning it more puzzling. One of the charges made to EPAs is on the 
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scope of issues targeted for liberalisation, which goes far beyond what WTO 
liberalization agenda foresees. On this front, Oxfam (2008:10) concludes that in almost 
every single area of negotiation - from trade in agricultural and industrial products, trade 
in services, intellectual property, investment, competition, government procurement to aid 
for trade - EPAs go far beyond WTO provisions, at the expense of ACP countries 
interests.  
If EPAs are to be implemented with the extension and timetable imposed by the EU, 
in practice this means the developing world will lose many of the “(...) the flexibilities 
they have fought for in the Doha Development Round” (Oxfam 2008:8). Groups such as 
G90 Developing Countries, the LDC and the Small and Vulnerable Economies should see 
their voice weakening at the WTO forum. Furthermore, limitations should also be 
imposed on South-South integration as EU is calling for the MFNP application, which 
forces ACP countries to extend the benefits they offer to other developing countries to 
Europe as well. Brazil already raised its voice against this provision at the multilateral 
forum, an initiative that was also backed by China and India, as these countries represent 
increasingly important markets to ACP countries exports. 
 As one can see from the table below, the full regional EPA initialled by Caribbean 




Table 14: EPAs and the WTO: Death Blow to development in the Doha Round 
 
Source: Oxfam (2008: 10) 
 
As WTO negotiations hold a more flexible calendar than that of EPAs, it is 
important that this latter deliver a result aligned with WTO rules and which defends ACP 




4. The Importance of Development Assistance - Aid for Trade Initiative Gains 
Momentum 
 
One of the issues that have raised substantial controversy within EPAs negotiations 
regards to development assistance and respective financing as a measure to foster the 
implementation of EPAs. Despite the successive calls by ACP countries for this kind of 
financial support to be included in negotiations, the EU has used a rather defensive 
rhetoric stating that: a) EPAs negotiations, as foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement, focus 
on trade related issues and not on development financing; b) development assistance is 
already covered by the European Development Fund (EDF); c) the European Commission 
was not mandated by EU’s member states to negotiate or close agreements in the area of 
development assistance under the framework of EPAs. However, as recognition on the 
need of financial assistance to help developing countries integrate into the global 
economy and rip the benefits out of trade liberalization grew, the European General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) decided on the 16-17 October 2006 to 
address EPA-related adjustment needs under the broader framework of Aid-for-Trade 
(AfT). It must be highlighted; however, that AfT is not conditional on the conclusion of 
EPAs (ECPDM, 2006b:1).  
 In light of ACP countries’ structural constraints mentioned on Chapter I, 
development assistance grows of importance, leading WTO’s director general Pascal 
Lamy to call attention on the role AfT can perform in overcoming such struggles: “Aid 
for Trade aims at improving the capacity of developing countries to reap the benefits of 
more open trade. For some developing members this will mean setting up testing facilities 
and reliable institutions to help to ensure that exported products meet the technical, 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and standards of export markets. For some others 
it would mean larger-scale projects such as improving transport infrastructure and trade 




4.1. What is Aid for Trade? 
 
 The AfT initiative was launched at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 
in December 2005. AfT initiatives intend to help developing countries build their capacity 
in order to benefit from international trade; they aim at putting trade at the centre of 
national strategies and policies. WTO holds a ―Coherence Mandate‖ which recognizes the 
international organization “(...) responsibility for promoting coherence in global 
economic policy making and for working with the World Bank, the IMF, and other 
international actors to deliver more coordinated international policy. Aid for Trade is a 
clear test of this mandate” (WTO Aid for Trade fact sheet). 
The primary premise of AfT is that it can promote growth and reduce poverty 
through trade promotion. However, for it to happen it is necessary to remove the barriers 
that impede the developing world from benefiting from the world trading system. Tariff 
and non-tariff barriers play an important role, but AfT gives special attention to internal 
barriers referring to lack of knowledge, inadequate financing and poor infrastructure – the 
so called supply-side constraints. According to the WTO (AfT Fact sheet) AfT 
encompasses four primary dimensions: technical assistance on trade strategies 
development, negotiation and implementation of agreements (trade policy and 
regulation); economic infrastructure building (roads, ports, energy networks, 
telecommunications that link domestic to international markets); productive capacity 
building targeting industries and sectors that yield comparative advantages, improve 
countries’ competitiveness as well as fostering export diversification; adjustment 
assistance to help managing transition costs from liberalization – fiscal revenue losses, 




Figure 10: WTO’s Types of AfT 
 
Source: WTO AfT Task force (cited in EC, 2008:2) 
 
AfT (WTO AfT presentation) will only be made available for those countries that 
consider trade a priority in their development strategy. As the WTO AfT Task Force 
stated in 2006 “Projects and programmes should be considered as Aid for Trade if these 
activities have been identified as trade-related development priorities in the recipient 
country’s national development strategies”. A demand-driven approach safeguards the 
ownership principle, noting that recipient countries should determine their Aft needs 
through the involvement of all stakeholders. Aid effectiveness principles are also to be 
safeguarded as AfT proposes itself to be results – oriented. Cooperation between donor 
and recipient countries is highly encouraged as well a strong involvement from the private 
sector, as this is the sector that is most involve in trade. 
AfT is part of the Overall Development Assistance (ODA) and it should be seen, 
according to WTO, as a complement to trade opening. According to OECD, trade-related 
ODA accounted for 26% of ODA over the 2002-2005 period. The figure below illustrates 




Figure 11: Share of Trade Related ODA in Overall Development Aid 
 
Source: OECD (cited in WTO AfT presentation) 
 
The gross of AfT is disbursed bilaterally by donors or through multilateral and 
regional finance and development organisations, like the World Bank or regional 
development banks. WTO points out that AfT should not divert resources away from 
other development priorities, so it should indeed take the form of new resources.  
 
Figure 12: Overall Distribution of Trade Related ODA by Program and Project 
 




 4.2. Will AfT Deliver on Its Promise? 
 
One of the challenges of AfT initiative is to be aware if it will become an important 
aid tool as it gains visibility and receives growing consensus towards its use or whether it 
will be ―business as usual‖. The 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting focused on the 
operationalization of AfT and on ways to improve it. Director General Pascal Lamy 
launched a Task Force to act on this front working on the recommendations that were 
mentioned on section 4.2. of this Chapter. Is was also suggested better monitoring and 
evaluation of AfT by the WTO, which should happen at three different levels: i) global 
monitoring by OECD (as this latter holds an important role in what regards to ODA 
monitoring); ii) self-evaluations by donors; iii) self-assessments by recipient countries. 
The results from this monitoring work are then compiled in an annual Report (WTO Aid 
for Trade fact sheet). 
WTO Director General Pascal Lamy worded on the need to encourage AfT in order 
to foster development, illustrating with Kenya’s flower export sector example, where EU 
€5 million AfT investments helped the industry to use pesticide and step into US and 
European markets, turning into one of the world’s leading exporters. Exports overcame 
US$700 million in 2006, employing two million workers, 80% of which generated by 
small-scale farms. It is important to highlight though, that the success of AfT in Kenya’s 
flower sector rests, to a large extent, on the fact that industrialised countries do not 
subsidise their flower domestic industry (ECPDM, 2007:9). According to WTO AfT 
presentation, in Sub-Saharan Africa annual infrastructure needs stand at US$17-22bn a 
year against spending of around US$10bn. Furthermore, if Africa enjoyed the same share 
of world exports today as it did in 1980, exports would be US$119bn higher, i.e. 5 times 
current aid flows. 
 
4.3. EU Strategy on Aid for Trade 
 
It was at the 2002 United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey that trade importance for development was emphasised by the international 
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community. The 2005 European Consensus on Development articulates trade and 
development recognizing it as key to development policies aimed at achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 
On the 15
th
 October 2007 the EU adopted the so-called ―EU Strategy on Aid for 
Trade‖, through which committed itself to increase the annual spending on trade-related 
assistance by 2010 to €2 billion annually, €1 billion of which provided by EU member 
states and the other half by EC. Around 50% of the funds will be directed to ACP 
countries, which should translate into an increase of €300-400 million a year. This move 
should be squared within the Doha Round, as the strategy was agreed one month before 
the WTO’s ―global review‖ on AfT in Geneva on November 20-21.  
The outcome of the ―global review‖ at the multilateral level was rather disappointing 
as did not comprise a new aid envelope or specific delivery mechanisms for AfT initiative 
(ECDPM, 2007/2008:16-17). The same happens with EU Strategy on AfT, which is 
considered part of EC ODA and, as such, is financed under the regular Community 
budget and the EDF. This latter count with a financial allocation of €22.682 million for 
the 2008-2013 period.“(...) the Community budget does not include specific, identifiable 
budget articles on “Aid for Trade”, except one regarding multilateral trade policy 
actions. The EC AfT can therefore only be identified through ex post analysis of 
programmes programmed.” (EC, 2008:4) 
As such, on EC’s fact sheet on Aid for Trade, dated 1
st
 October 2008 was noted that 
EU provides around 1/3 of total ODA flows and around 15% to 20% of the EU 
development assistance is directed towards AfT activities. EU’s overall AfT amounted to 
€7.28 billion in 2006, from which €2.56 billion through the European Commission and 
the remaining €4.71bn through members states. EC compared this figure to an average of 




Table 15: EU Aid for Trade Commitments (2001-2006) 
 
Source: OECD-CRS (cited in CEC, 2008: 17), EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom. TPR stands for Trade Policy and Regulation; TRI for Trade-Related Infrastructure and BPC for 
Building Productive Capacities (which includes Trade Development). 
 
EU’s AfT flows are channelled primarily to SSA (39.5%), followed by Asia and the 
Pacific (27.9%), with the remaining pretty evenly distributed among Mediterranean, 
Europe and Latin America & Caribbean. CEC (2008:25) estimates that 43% of EU’s total 
AfT commitments over 2001-2006 were provided to ACP countries. 
 
Figure 13: EU AfT commitments to ACP regions (2001-2006) 
 
Source: CEC (2008:26) 
 
It is important to stress out, however, that commitments do not represent effective 
aid delivery and if one wants to assess aid effectiveness it has to dig into the assistance 
funds that has effectively been disbursed. Oxfam (2006:9-10) underlines the discrepancy 
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between EU promised aid (channelled through EDF over five-year cycles) and the money 
actually disbursed. This mismatch is evident on last cycle 2001-2006, when EU promised 
€15bn in aid to ACP countries but only 28% were actually disbursed, on the 1995-2000 
(8
th
 EDF) only 20% were disbursed and the same reality applies to other EDF assistance 
packages.  
 
Table 16: Funds Allocated and Spent During Each Fiver-year Financing Cycle 
(million €) 
 
Source: Grynberg, R. and Clarke, A (2006)
29
 (cited in Oxfam 2006:10) 
 
Aware of the flaws of EU’s disbursement mechanisms ACP governments have 
called for a separate and additional EPA financing facility, but without success, as already 
mentioned above. The EU decided instead to increase the amount under the 10
th
 EDF 
funding cycle (2008-2013) up to €22.8bn, but remains to be seen if and to which speed 
will this promise turn into money disbursement. 
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4.2.1. Relying Too Much on “Best-Endeavour” Terminology 
  
The EU Strategy has the purpose of enhancing the pro-poor focus, improve the 
quality of AfT and rise EU’s capacity to provide this kind of aid. It applies the same 
principles and guidelines to every contributor (EC and EU member states), sharing EU 
commitments on policy coherence, enhancing division of labour as well as the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Nonetheless, the Strategy falls short of expectations in 
what regards to financial resources, as these will be entirely dependent on voluntary 
contribution from donors, relying too much on ―best-endeavour‖ terminology. This could 
prove to be a problem as it implies a significant increase in EU member states 
contributions by 2010 whereas the 2008-2013 10
th
 EDF negotiated by EC puts AfT 
contribution already close to that level. The quality of trade-related financing is therefore 
being put in question (ECDPM, 2007/2008:16-17).  
  
4.2.2. No New Aid Envelope or Specific AfT Delivery Mechanisms 
  
ACP recipient countries are worried and would like to see guaranteed that EU’s AfT 
initiatives involve new resources in addition to those that are channelled through the EDF.  
The regional programming of the 10
th
 EDF focuses on regional integration and trade 
(including EPA support) and envisaged regional strategy papers and indicative 
programmes for each of the six ACP regions cooperating with the EU. The EC suggested 
so-called regional AfT packages, which, as mentioned above, do not comprise additional 
financial resources at the regional level but instead aim at increase the link between the 
process of regional integration and EPA support, and also the link of the first to donor 
coordination. EC’s initiative on regional AfT packages intends to provide “(...) an 
effective, coherent and concrete EU response to needs and priorities expressed by the 
ACP countries and regions, including in national and regional development plans, and to 
foster coordination among all donors and recipients”
30
. This raises, however, an 
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interesting question: how will AfT packages increase the link between the process of 
regional integration and EPA support, if the EPA negotiation process in itself is working, 
in many cases, as a deadlock to the regional integration process? 
 
4.2.3. The Ownership Principle 
 
The Strategy is demand-driven (in line with WTO guidelines) and as such recipient 
countries will have to take the lead and identify priorities and promote initiatives, squared 
within a national development strategy – AfT is has to be taken as a priority in the so 
called Country or Regional Strategy Papers – CSPs/RSPs. Trade-related support can only 
be made available if “(...) the country concerned considers it to be essential to its own 
national development agenda. Therefore, the particular challenge in fulfilling the 
commitments undertaken in the EU’s AfT strategy is about how to create solid demand in 
Aid for Trade” (EC, 2008:5).  
According to Rose Tiemoko
31
 (ECPDM, 2007:9) AfT priorities in Africa relate to 
strengthen public and private institutional and human resources (either at the national as 
at the regional level), improving and expanding infrastructures, trade facilitation (and 
coordination of trade promotion strategies) and enhancing regulations. The author stresses 
out the need to reassure the coherence of strategies as well as the articulation with the 
regional integration process, calling for the involvement of development banks in what 
regards to encouraging and promoting regional projects and infrastructure policy, adding 
that these could be one of the channels through which AfT could be delivered.  
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4.2.4. The Alignment Principle 
 
This is one of the areas which is raising significant controversy, as EPAs 
negotiations are working more as a deadlock to African regional integration process, as 
seen on Chapter II. Planning documents from regional organisations (strategies, 
operational plans or procedures) should be respected and applied even as this requests 
adaptation from donor countries. Birgit Hofmann
32
 (ECPDM, 2008b: 10) calls on the 
need to enhance coordination between donors themselves and ACP countries regarding 
the targeted sectors, noting that EU Commission could be pivotal at this level as it is 
actively involved in important development areas in the different ACP regions, providing 
therefore an central contribution to improve aid effectiveness. 
To sum up, EPAs negotiation process is advancing more quickly and has been 
imposed a tighter deadline than WTO’s roundtable. Furthermore, evidence suggest that it 
envisages a wider agenda in terms of scope, demanding therefore extra careful and 
thought on the way ACP countries negotiate EPAs, as these could cap ACP countries 
bargaining power at the WTO forum as well as their competitive position in the global 
economy. 
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TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR EPAs 
 
The EU is pressuring ACP countries towards fast liberalization, under EPAs 
negotiations running course. This Chapter tries to evaluate whether protectionism is 
counterproductive for development or if, on the contrary, it can yield it when adopted at 
the elementary phases of the development process. To support this latter view it first 
analyses arguments used in support and against free trade (Section 1). It then moves to the 
analysis of Ha-Joon Chang historical approach towards development, which provides 
evidence that in the past, current developed economies on their run to development also 
embraced for trade restrictiveness and industry promotion policies; additionally, it 
approaches other two authors - Robert Wade and Alice Amsden - whose work 
conclusions point on the same direction (Section 2). Once consolidated this background it 
builds a bridge with EPAs, proposing the identification of initiatives and tools ACP 
countries can adopt to better protect their interests at the ongoing negotiations (Section 3). 
 
1. Arguments in Favour and Against Free Trade 
 
 Krugman (2005:163-171) develops on three major arguments economists present 
in favour of free trade: (i) free trade avoids efficiency losses related to protection, 
according to theoretical models on cost-benefit analysis, increasing the national welfare; 
(ii) other benefits apart from those related to the elimination of distortions on production 
and consumption; (iii) even if not perfect, free trade is better than any other policy the 
government might adopt. Some economists encounter additional gains from free trade, 
beyond the traditional cost-benefit analysis, related to economies of scale enjoyed by 
small countries’ as result of free trade (the rational is that protectionist measures foster the 
 
81 
proliferation of industries and scale production inefficiencies). Furthermore, free trade is 
often seen as a higher facilitator of learning and innovation than an ―administered‖ 
system, as it encouragers entrepreneurship to compete internationally. There is also a 
political argument in favour of free trade and which is related to the fact that trade 
policies are more influenced by special interests than by domestic cost-benefit 
considerations. Under this line of thought free trade comes as the first option even if in a 
purely economic ground it does not prove to be the most adequate policy. 
 In what regards to the arguments against free trade, the author mentions the 
argument of terms of trade, according to which in the case of a small enough tariff the 
benefits of terms of trade outweigh the costs, leading therefore to higher national welfare 
than in the case of free trade. One of the criticisms made to this argument is that it should 
prove of little use for small countries, as these have little capacity of affecting the prices 
of either its imports as exports. The other argument against free trade rests on the 
questioning of the accurateness of concepts of producer and consumer surplus as ways to 
quantify benefits and costs; it says that the producer surplus does not quantify properly 
the benefits resulting from the production of a good whenever there are domestic markets 
failures. This view is intertwined with the second best theory according to which free 
trade policies are only desirable as long as all markets function adequately, other wise the 
Government’s intervention might contribute to the national welfare increase. On this front 
the author notes that in developing economies market failures are indeed significant, what 
seems to provide support for greater Government intervention. The discussion proceeds 
with defenders of free trade arguing that economists can not diagnose market failures well 
enough in order to prescribe economic policies. The correction of market failures should 
be done as directly as possible because of the indirect results of economic policies, which 
might portend unintended distortions of incentives in other economic sectors. This is 
where the political rhetoric feeds into, as if market failures aren’t that bad after all, 
politicians might opt for free trade policies as the selection the second best policy might 




2. Does Trade Restrictiveness Caps Development? 
 
It is not surprising that developing countries, particularly low and middle income 
economies, are the ones holding the highest protectionism (as illustrated on Chapter I). In 
the past, economies on their way to development also embraced trade restrictiveness 
policies. On its historical approach towards development, Chang (2003:1-3) notes that 
“(…) when they were developing countries themselves, virtually all of today’s developed 
countries did not practice free trade (and laissez-faire industrial policy as its domestic 
counterpart)”. The author goes even further by noting that now-developed countries 
(NDC) “(…) actively used interventionist trade and industrial policies aimed at 
promoting, not simply “protecting”, it should be emphasised, infant industries during 
their catch-up periods”. 
 
2.1. Protectionism: the Road Today’s Developed Economies Rode in the Past 
 
Several examples of countries embarking on trade restrictiveness are presented on 
Chang research: Britain, United States of America (USA), Germany, France, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan and East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). 
Britain and the USA, in particular, are presented as the two countries that used protection 
and subsidies most aggressively, contrary to conventional wisdom, which usually presents 
them as the runners of the strongest free-market, free trade policy. Indeed both countries 
only embarked on liberalisation when they felt they were prepared, what took place only 
after a long period of protectionism and of sympathy for the infant industry argument 
(which was around 1860 in the case of Britain and after the World War II in USA’s case).  
Supported by a study from Bairoch (1993)
33
, Chang (2003:5-6) notes that “(…) 
contrary to the popular belief, Britain’s technological lead that enabled this shift to a free 
trade regime had been achieved “behind high and long-lasting tariff barriers”. He also 
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writes that “between 1816 and the end of the Second World War, the US had one of the 
highest average tariff rates on manufacturing imports in the world.(…) It was only (…) 
with its industrial supremacy unchallenged, that the US liberalized its trade (although not 
as unequivocally as Britain did in the mid-nineteenth century) and started championing 
the cause of free trade”. The author intentionally points out that tariff protection was not 
the only measure adopted by the US Government to foster growth, which included 
government (Research and Development) R&D spending, higher investment in public 
education and development of transportation infrastructure.  
As stated above the author also studies Japan and the East Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries, noting that “(…) in the economic successes of Japan and other 
East Asian countries (except Hong Kong), interventionist trade and industrial policies 
played a crucial role. Notable are the similarities between their policies and those used 
by other NDCs before them, including, above all, eighteenth-century Britain and 
nineteenth – century United States” (Chang 2003:11). Nonetheless it recognises that 
policies used by East Asian countries in the post Second World War period were far more 
sophisticated, with higher resource to export subsidies and tariff rebates for imported raw 




Table 17: Average tariff Rates on Manufacturing Products for Selected Developed 
Countries in Their Early Stages of Development 
 
Source: Bairoch,1993:40 (cited in Ha-Joon Chang,2002:2) 
 
2.2. More than Tariff Protection, Industrial Promotion Led the Catch-up Process 
 
One of the points that is strongly highlighted by Chang is the use of some form of 
infant industry promotion strategy by NDC, which links to the idea that more than protect 
(through the imposition of tariffs) these countries intended to promote industry to fuel 
their catch-up process “(…) During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, while 
maintaining a relatively low average tariff rate, Germany accorded strong tariff 
protection to strategic industries, while maintaining generally low tariffs. Similarly, 
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Sweden provided targeted protection for the steel and the engineering industries, while 
maintaining generally low tariffs. Germany, Sweden, and Japan actively used non-tariff 
measures to promote their industries, such as establishment of state-owned “model 
factories”, state financing of risky ventures, support for R&D, and the development of 
institutions that promote public-private cooperation”. Tariff protection was just a part of 
a global strategy which comprised a number of other tools “(…) such as export subsidies, 
tariff rebates on inputs used for exports, conferring of monopoly rights, cartel 
arrangements, directed credits, investment planning, manpower planning, R&D supports, 
and the promotion of institutions that allow public-private cooperation” (Chang. 
2003:12), which were combined by each country in the way they considered to best serve 
their interests. 
Acknowledging the historical path of the NDC, Chang shows its scepticism towards 
the developed world recommendation for developing countries to liberalize their 
economies and embark on free trade (what he calls of “good policies”), as those were not 
the policies they have followed in the past. He concludes that it is not fair that these 
countries kick away the ladder they have climbed up to get where they are now. And 
though he recognizes that average tariff rates for developing countries are higher today 
than those recorded in the past by NDC, he adds that if factoring in the productivity gap
34
 
against advanced economies (now and then), today’s developing countries are still 
lagging behind the level of protectionism that was adopted by NDC. Chang goes even 
further by noting that the poor economic performance of developing countries over the 
last three decades should be largely put the use of the called “good policies” of free-trade 
and laissez faire, which don’t seem to fit to developing countries’ development needs. 
Instead he proposes that “WTO rules and other multilateral trade agreements should be 
rewritten in such a way that a more active use of infant industry promotion tools (e.g., 
tariffs, subsidies) is allowed” (Chang, 2003:14). 
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Oxfam (2008:11) also made an exercise comparing current tariffs levels in SSA in 
with those of European countries at the same stages of the industrialization process, 
concluding that SSA tariffs levels are significantly lower. The NGO calls attention to 
ACP countries’ bitter experience of liberalisation through the 80s, outlining that “(…) in 
many African countries growth rates halved and living standards heavily declined”.  
 
Table 18: African and European Tariffs During Industrialization 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2007; Ha-Joon Chang (2005) (cited in 
Oxfam, 2008:11) 
 
As such it concludes on the need to strategic governance of the economy, with 
governments entitled to use tariffs and other trade policies in defence of vulnerable 
producers and aimed at stimulate new value-added industries, alerting to the risk of EPAs 
remove important policy instruments from the hands of ACP governments (Oxfam, 
2008:14-16). 
Amsden (1989:3-23) is another author which addresses the role the State performed 
on development, studying the industrialization case of South Korea. She uses the term of 
development’s state to describe the discipline exerted by the State on the market and on 
private companies with the purpose of development (instead of wealth accumulation by 
itself). Such discipline involved an industrialization strategy based on: (i) discipline 
towards activity licensing as well as implementation of penalisation/compensation on 
goals achievement; (ii) limited number of entrants in each industry in order to foster 
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industrial concentration (economies of scale gains, the launch of Chaebols and incentives 
to intense competition); (iii) to counterbalance the policy of industrial concentration an 
active policy of control of monopolistic practices was implemented, which involved the 
previous negotiation of prices; (iv) State control over financing activities supported on a 
strong regulation of financing activities (in order to combat rent seeking behaviour) and 
close control of the capital balance; (v) launch of a technology policy directed towards 
technological independence (firstly based on learning through external licensing and 
technical assistance but with the purpose of promoting an endogenous technological 
change process), which involved strong State investment on education and training 
sectors; (vi) the adoption of expansive fiscal policies aimed at finance and support long 
term investments; (vii) underweight of welfare redistributive policies in favour of 
production goals. 
Robert Wade constitutes also an important reference in the domain of development 
economy, studying the role of the State in the industrialization process of Eastern Asia 
(particularly illustrating the case of Taiwan). In its work, Wade (2005:15-22), proposes 
the concept of governed market to describe the relation established between the State and 
the market, where the first holds effective political leadership over the latter. The author 
aggregates the industrial policies led and implemented by the State on three different 
types: (i) functional economic policies (foreign exchange policies, macroeconomic and 
competition policies); (ii) multisectoral horizontal policies (incentives to R&D, to small 
and medium enterprises, investment in ports infrastructure); (iii) sectoral policies to 
promote specific sectors and subsectors. Wade questions the liberal explanation 
(presented in World Bank studies) that the rapid growth of Eastern Asia was based on the 
opening up of trade regimes and strong exports growth. Instead, the author stresses the 
organizational structure of the development State, which enabled Taiwan to conquer the 
technological level of OECD middle-income countries, which further led him to support 
the strategy of the governed market in the context of developing countries, including 




2.3. From Infant Industry to the Infant Economy Argument 
 
Finally, Stiglitz (2006:71) advocates temporary nascent industry protectionism. He 
argues that if countries solely focused on its own comparative advantage, many wouldn’t 
leave the pattern of production of low value added production. He therefore argues that 
more important than measuring the growth rate of the developing world is accessing how 
it can close the knowledge gap against developed countries. In order to step into valued-
added sectors, temporary protectionism should take place until those industries are strong 
enough to weather international competition: “(…) Tariffs result in higher prices – high 
enough that the new industries can cover costs, invest in research, and make the other 
investments that they need in order to be able eventually to stand on their own feet. This is 
called the “infant industry argument” for protection”.  
One of the critics made to infant industry argument refers to too much protection, 
which impedes infant industries from growing and face competition; or the use of the 
argument in defence of private interests, harming inclusively other industries and public 
welfare. As a response to this latter criticism, the author suggests the argument of the 
infant economy, which implies a broad-based protection: “broad-based industrial 
production can lead to an increase in the size of the industrial sector, which is, almost 
everywhere, the source of innovation; many of these advances spill over into the rest of 
the economy, as do the benefits from the development of institutions, like financial 
markets, that accompany the growth of an industrial sector. Moreover, a large and 
growing industrial sector (and the tariffs on manufactured goods) provides revenues with 
which the government can fund education, infrastructure and other ingredients necessary 
for broad-based growth” (Stiglitz, 2006: 71-72). 
 
3. Key Issues for EPAs Negotiations: Turning Them Into a Pro-Development Tool? 
 
EPA’s negotiations play an important role in the definition of ACP countries’ 
position in the multilateral forum and in the global economy. As such EPA’s negotiations 
should evolve with careful thought and within a reasonable timeframe, opposite to the 
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spirit that is ruling negotiations as the EU imposes a tight deadline. Much is at stake and 
to turn EPAs into pro-development tools key issues have to be addressed. 
 
3.1. Negotiating the Biggest Possible Asymmetry Reciprocity 
 
Alpha et al. (2005: 35-36) call the attention to the need of flexibilizing the 
interpretation of the GATT’s XXIV article particularly when dealing with a FTA which is 
composed by partners holding development gaps among themselves, like is the case of 
EPA’s. Stevens (2008:214) also shares the view that negotiations should have taken 
centre stage in the redefinition of the article, to then take this issue, in a jointly move of 
ACP countries and EU, to the WTO forum. ACP countries asked EU to ask for an 
extended WTO waiver, which would give them more time to prepare for and negotiate 
EPAs but EU was not willing to do so (and indeed it was the EU that had to act in the 
WTO, the country owning problematic trade policies). With this option excluded, ACP 
countries should fight for the biggest asymmetry possible in the EPA’s, as well as for a 
longest possible implementation period. Article XXIV provides a rather vague definition 
of a FTA or CU, which is open to interpretation, giving therefore room for fiercer 
negotiation on this front. 
According to EBCAM (2008:1-2), the AU ministers of Trade and Finance have 
selected the number of provisions that are included in IEPAs and which are to be 
reviewed during full EPAs negotiations and which range from the definition of 
substantially all trade, transitional periods, export taxes, free circulation of goods, national 
treatment, bilateral safeguards, infant industry, non-execution clause and MFN clause. 
The rendez-vous clauses in IEPAs refer to services and trade related issues to be 
addressed in negotiations but do not prescribe the outcome of these negotiations. 
Oxfam (2008:22-23) makes recommendations for ACP countries obtain fair deal in 
services. It suggests a good and effective regulation of both commercial and essential 
services, good management and regulation of foreign investment to ensure a high level 
quality of service and universal access to essential services, this latter provided by 
publicly owned and well-funded companies. The provision of universal essential services 
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is indeed something that must be safeguarded, as a significant proportion of ACP 
countries population lives in poverty and as such wouldn’t be able to have pay for such 
services should these sectors be liberalised. The Caribbean is the only region that has 
concluded EPA negotiations on services, and according to the regional agreement up to 
75% of services sectors have been liberalised, which include a wide range from book-
keeping and financial services to medical and health services and tourism. 
Among other Singapore issues
35
, the NGO targets investment, noting that “(…) 
foreign investment can work in the public interest and add value to the development 
process‖ if EPAs “(…) ensure that foreign investment generates value for the local 
economy and local people, stimulating development through the creation of decent jobs, 
reinvestment of profits, training of personnel, linkages to local companies, and equitable 
sharing of benefits, and by upholding national environmental, labour and social 
standards; ensure that the public interest takes precedence over the interests of private 
investors” (Oxfam, 2008:28). Also on this front the NGO presents the case of Caribbean 
where the liberalisation to foreign investment was made with very little limits. 
 
                                                          
35
 The Singapore issues refer to four working groups set up during the World Trade Organization Ministerial 
Conference of 1996 in Singapore. These groups are tasked with these issues: transparency in government 
procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and investment, and trade and competition. These issues were 




Figure 14: Caribbean EPA: Opening Up to Foreign Investment 
 
Source: Oxfam (2008:29) 
 
3.2. Calling for SPS Harmonization  
 
There is broad consensus towards the need of international harmonization of non-
tariff barriers and SPS issues that minimizes costs without putting consumer protection or 
public health at risk. The WTO has two agreements to deal with these issues - the SPS 
agreement refers to international standards established by specialised institutions, such as 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission for human health matters, the International Office 
for Epizootics for Animal Health and the International Convention for the Protection of 
Plants. The World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) 
refers to quality standards comprising intrinsic product characteristics like size, 
appearance, functions, performance, and way to be packed or labelled. Still, the current 
WTO allows member states to establish standards far more demanding than international 
ones as long such option is scientifically grounded. Czubala, Shepherd and Wilson (2007, 
p.1-36) studied the impact of EU standards on African textiles and clothing exports, 
concluding that non-harmonized standards (they assumed ISO standards as the proxy for 
international norms) are more trade restrictive to African exports.  
Arbitrary regime on SPS imposes strong constraints over ACP countries 
(particularly on those exporting agricultural products), which not only lack the financial, 
technical and human capabilities to deal properly with such complex standards, but also 
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fall short of their participation in the drawing of such measures. Acknowledging the 
difficulties faced by developing countries to apply to SPS measures imposed by the 
developed world, but also taking into account the need to protect consumers and public 
health, the WTO contemplates, in the framework of the special and differential treatment, 
technical assistance to the developing world provided by the developed country 
implementing stricter SPS measures. ACP countries should therefore demand such 
assistance while negotiating EPAs. Furthermore, ACP countries should make their voices 
and interests be heard at the international organisations in charge of defining the content 
of international standards whilst Europe should think of aligning its SPS with 
international standards in order to avoid excessive constraints on trade (Alpha et al., 2005: 
29-31). 
 
3.3. RoO Easing and Harmonization  
 
It is important to prevent that RoO are used with protectionist purposes and reassure 
their role of fostering the integration of the developing world (receiving special treatment) 
into the world economy. The World Bank (2008:16) proposes that “(…) all the different 
combinations of RoO that can exist for a single good in certain PTAs could be abandoned 
for a single value content, which could also be uniformized across goods, as in the case of 
AFTA RoO regime”. Current EPAs negotiations should therefore made strong efforts 
towards simplified and harmonized RoO across preferential trade agreements, 
contemplating an exceptional exemption regime for LDC (given their strong structural 
constraints), issues which should later be raised up at the multilateral forum. L.Hinkle et 
al. (2005, 277) proposes “(…) a 10 percent value-added rule as a non-restrictive rule of 
origin. If the value-added requirement is higher, cumulation rules should be global to 
allow ACP producers maximum access to the world’s lowest-cost inputs and to avoid 




3.4. Softening EPA-Related Fiscal Revenue Losses  
 
The dependence of African governments of fiscal revenue is one of the issues that 
raise more controversy on EPAs implementation. As UNECA (2008:37) notes, intra-
African trade flows analysis suggest that trade liberalization usually benefit those 
countries more industrially developed which can leverage up their exports. To offset this 
deadlock the multilateral organization suggests the establishment and effective 
implementation of compensation and equalization schemes, which could be financed 
through the imposition of small tax of between 0.5% up to 1% on imports from outside of 
Africa. The collected funds should help to mitigate these losses and a part of them should 
be used to finance development projects in the least developed countries of the RECs in 
order to overcome the supply-side and infrastructures constraints. Additionally, value-
added taxes are other of the ways to reduce dependence on trade taxes but the 
implementation of this measure is very difficulty given the narrow fiscal base on many of 
these countries, where population already has very little purchasing power. In order to 
overcome the difficulty in setting a common external tariff, the same report suggests the 
organization of a regional conference on common external tariffs, under the lead of AU, 
with the purpose of examining the challenges in this area and “(…) propose a common set 
of principles and a framework for application at the subregional level, taking into 
consideration the overriding need to establish the African common market as part of the 
accelerated programme of the Union Government”. 
Hinkle et al. (2005: 269-272) also make concrete proposals on this front, one of 
which related to the eligibility of sensitive products with strong impact on revenue loss to 
be excluded from liberalization, something that is being used and negotiated under 
ongoing EPAs, though as many countries face significant technical and institutional 
constraints they are not in the best condition to select these products within the tight 
deadlines that are being imposed by EU. They also suggest that those countries not 
levying value-added tax (VAT) and excises on imports, could impose them or increase the 
taxes already being levied in order to counterbalance the loss of revenues. The key 
question regarding this latter issue is the margin EPAs negotiations and WTO norms 
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concede for such a move; furthermore, many of these countries have went through SAP, 
which limited the extension of taxes use. The fourth argument used by Hinkle regards to 
the length of the implementation period of EPAs and how its combination with 
development assistance could help to smooth the impact of loss revenue. In particular, the 
author stresses the importance aid for trade (A4T) - in the form of technical and financial 
assistance - plays through this transition period.  
 
3.5. Definition of Sensitive and Special Products  
 
Though both WTO and EPA negotiations portend that ACP countries liberalise 
trade, the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) granted to developing countries at 
WTO, and the asymmetric reciprocity EPAs comprise (through GATTS XXIV article), 
allow ACP countries to exclude a certain number of products from liberalisation. 
Therefore, in addition to the sensitive products all WTO members can designate, the 
developing world is allowed to select a number of products based on reasons of food 
security and rural development – the so called special products. So, special products are 
more ambitious than sensitive products in terms of concept, and it is important that 
criteria to determine the first, differs from that characterizing the latter. ACP countries 
could therefore use options already in use by other countries such as exclusion of special 
products from all tariff reductions (instead of a smaller tariff reduction for sensitive 
products), possible tariff rearmament, import quotas, longer quota periods, among others 
(Alpha et al., 2005: 33). As Hinkle et al. (2005, 269:270) note, defining a common list of 
sensitive products to be excluded from the negotiations with the EU might involve 
complex negotiations as the levels of protection differ in size and structure among 
countries. This task is even harder when a consensus on sensitive/special products 
definition is expected to be reached at a regional level, so those ACP countries in need of 
help should call for technical assistance on such areas. 
The implementation of EPAs should portend the elimination of escalating custom 
duties and residual tariff barriers imposed by EU on some ACP countries exports, but for 
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this to effectively happen EU’s sensitive products should also be tackled on EPAs 
negotiations. 
Oxfam (2008:16) analysis of initialled EPAs concludes that only 2-20% of imports 
are excluding from liberalisation and these excluded products are mostly confined to 
agricultural products. This portends a perverse consequence for ACP countries, whose 
manufacturing activities might be at risk, putting the development process of these 
countries in question, as it makes a lot more difficult the migration towards a higher 
value-added pattern of production. 
 
3.6. Use of Safeguard Measures  
 
Alpha et al. (2005: 33-34) highlight that another option that should be used by 
ACP countries, regards to special safeguard measures, whose use WTO authorises when a 
country intends to protect itself against massive imports or a significant decrease in the 
price of imports. In practice it translates into temporary tariff rearmament. Experience 
shows that safeguard measures are difficult to implement and time consuming, which 
leave them more reserved to the developed world. As WTO prefigures a special safeguard 
mechanism a similar mechanism should be considered at the level of EPAs. ACP 
countries should call for a simplification of the safeguard mechanism covering the 
following points: “(…) trigger criteria (price and/or volume threshold), triggering 
mechanism (automatic or specific procedure), duration, eligible products and in 
particular the link with sensitive and special products and finally the content (additional 
customs duties or other possibilities, such as quantitative restrictions).”  
Oxfam (2008:4) analysed initialled EPAs concluding that “(…) deals fail to help 
tackle food insecurity. Though allowing some protection, weak safeguards in the deals 
necessarily expose small-scale farmers to sudden surges of competition from imports, 
undermining staple food markets”. Furthermore, the NGO adds that “(…) rather than 
supporting countries to change the terms on which they engage, the deals risk reinforcing 
the unequal trade and investment relationship that ACP countries are already struggling 




Table 19: Oxfam Put Initialled EPAs to the Development Test 
 
Source: Oxfam 2008:4 
 




The call for technical and financial assistance to tackle supply-side constraints 
(infrastructure, production capacity), for trade facilitation, SPS and RoO links directly to 
the development component of the EPA’s, which should be bolstered over current 
negotiations through additional AfT. Greater volumes of AfT, a special deliver 
mechanism and a closer link to EPAs have been demanded by ACP countries, but without 
success. ACP countries and regions should keep on calling higher financial assistance and 
stronger articulation between AfT and EPAs. According to Oxfam (2008:19) the upgrade 
of Africa’s basic infrastructure it would be necessary US$200 billion, an impressive 
amount when compared to the €22.8 billion 10
th
 EDF (2008-2013 funding cycle). 
Given the demand-driven approach of EU’s Aft initiative, ACP countries/regions 
need to square trade-related support as a priority in their development strategies and 
present a plan to the EU if they want to apply for AfT. Lead such proactive role of 
defining a plan and list respective priorities might prove challenging for recipient 
countries that have to cope with limited technical and human resources, more even if 
factoring into the deadlock EPAs have raised to the regional integration process. Still, 
support should be given to those countries/regions where strategies are lacking. There is 
wide consensus that AfT initiatives should be targeted at a regional level, with regional 
communities on charge of formulating medium-term operational strategies and related 
work programmes with comprehensive and detailed priorities regarding regional 
integration and EPA support, but this would demand the integration process to move as its 
own speed and not that is being imposed by the EU (ECPDM, 2008b: 10).  
 
3.8. Prioritizing the Regional Integration Process 
 
The need for integration in Africa is indisputable if the continent intends to position 
itself strategically in the global economy, promote and protect its interests. Oxfam 
(2008:12) stresses the role of regional integration for the development of manufacturing 
activities, as it widen markets, offer economies of scale, fosters specialization and value 
added creation. It outlines EAC and SADC, whose exports on manufactured goods to 
other countries in their regions already surpass 50%, compared to 12% exported to 
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Europe. Still, do not be deceived intra—trade in ACP countries remains pretty low, with 
Caribbean only exporting 12% of its exports to the region. 
As UNECA (2008:34-36) notes, Africa’s trade within itself remains little when 
compared to internal trade of regions like Europe and Asia, even after the efforts carried 
out on trade liberalization by Regional Economic Communities (RECs): “according to 
WTO 2006 international trade statistics, intra-African trade as a percentage of total 
exports was only 9.8% and 8.9% in 2000 and 2005 respectively, compared with 72.7% in 
2001 and 73.2% in 2005 for Europe’s export trade, and 66.8% and 66.7% respectively, 
among the 25 countries of the European Union. (…) Asia’s intra-export trade as a 
percentage of total exports was 51.2% in 2005, while South and Central America’s was 
24.3%”. One of the reasons behind low intra-African trade relates to the little production 
and manufacturing base (as we are dealing with economies with little levels of economic 
diversification, with most of the African countries trading natural-resource based 
products) and the infrastructures deficiencies (roads, railways, electricity and other forms 
of energy, technology) already developed on Chapter I. 
UNECA (2008:34-36) refers to the fact that African countries trade more with the 
EU than among themselves, as over 90% of exports go abroad, with the EU and the USA 
accounting for over 60% of the total. This pattern of dependence is explained by the 
strong demand for commodities, the growth within the OECD, the Uruguay Round 
negotiations and the resulting impact on the reduction of average tariffs, the USA AGOA 
as well as EU’s EBA initiative. Trade relations are just not confined to EUA and USA as 
China imports 25% of its oil from Africa, with Sino-Africa trade growing from US$12mn 




Table 20: African Merchandise Exports 
 
Source: UNECA 2008 
 
3.9 African Union Empowerment in Regional Integration Process and on EPAs 
 
Inn 2003, UNECA (2003:62-63) called for the AU to “(…) provide an impetus for 
relaunching the integration agenda and positioning Africa in the global economic and 
political mainstream”. The same report noted that “(…) African union structures need 
supranational clout to enforce African Union interests first over parochial national 
interests”. Other areas of consensus on the report relate to the rationalization and 
empowerment of RECs, the involvement of the private sector in the identification, 
formulation and implementation of integration policies and programmes, the set up of an 
integration ministry in countries combined with relevant subnational structures or an 
appointed coordinator with full authority and capacity, as well as the adoption of common 
documents for cross-border transactions and clearance of cargo, vehicles and people 
(UNECA 2003:60-72).  
UNECA (2006) Report reflected on regional integration in Africa but focusing on 
institutions and on the need to build and strengthen this latter to sustain development, 
translating the case of Europe where strong institutions supported the regional integration 
process. It directly admits that “countries need to improve the efficiency of their services 
by reducing rent-seeking and corruption and increasing democratic control over 
institutions” (UNECA, 2006:25). The establishment of key institutions, like the African 
Parliament, the African Court of Justice, the African Central Bank and the African 
Investment Bank is one of the ways to speed the regional integration process and “(…) 
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the African Union is expected to make a tremendous difference to the substance and pace 
of progress towards integration goals”, by providing the necessary continental policy 
guidance and framework. It also emphasised the need to rationalize RECs as it considered 
this “(…) offers the continent opportunities to redesign its integration institutions to 
speed the creation of the African Economic Community” and recognizes the need to 
impose disciplines and sanctions on RECs that deviate from the continental objective 
(UNECA, 2006:41). 
UNECA (2008) Report suggests the need to rationalize the RECs and not recognize 
more that the eight that have been elected as the main pillars of the AU. The Abuja 
Treaty, adopted in 1991 and operational in 1994 had the purpose of establish a continental 
economic community through coordination, harmonization and progressive integration of 
the RECs. The Constitutive Act of the AU acknowledges that the primary objective of the 
Union is to establish an African Economic Community and RECs should have a role and 
responsibilities towards the targeting of that goal.  
 
Table 21: REC’s Recognized by AU as the Pillars of Africa 
Economic Community 
 
Source: UNECA 2008 
 
On this front UNECA (2008:36) makes a clear suggestion: ―RECs and their 
constituent member States need to push harder than ever for a fully integrated common 
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market with the removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers and the free circulation of all 
factors of production, including capital, labour and investments. A fully operational 
common market could provide an incentive for economies-of-scale production. 
Furthermore, the RECs should consciously promote the multinational exploitation of and 
investments in natural resource endowments to take advantage of economies of scale and 
the rational and optimal use of such resources”. And here the multilateral organization 
makes the bridge towards Aid for Trade by highlighting the importance of this initiative 
to build the multinational production capacity that is necessary to allow the migration 
from a pattern of primary commodities production towards higher value-added activities. 
In face of strong evidence that EPAs are hindering the regional integration process, 
African leaders have called for an empowered African Union (AU), which could review 
all EPAs deals before these turn into law
36
, an initiative which has, however, faced EU’s 
resistance
37
. The AU Commission is preparing, with the technical support of the UNECA 
an Africa EPA template, with the purpose to guide the negotiations with the EU 
(EBCAM, 2008:2). 
 
                                                          
36
 Assembly of the AU, ―Declaration on EPAs‖, Addis Ababa, DOC.EX.CL/394(XII), 3 January 2008 (cited in 
Oxfam 2008:19) 
37





EPAs are EU’s proposal of commercial cooperation with ACP countries after a 
long period of preferential non reciprocal commercial treatment from EU to ACP exports 
which did not produce the expected results. The share of ACP countries’ exports in world 
trade was left at subdued levels, unveiling trade preferences erosion against other 
developing countries, as liberalisation negotiations at the multilateral level speed and 
deepened up. However, EU’s strongest argument for EPAs introduction was the non-
compliance with the preferential non-reciprocal treatment with WTO’s MFNP and the 
growing pressure for its correction. 
EPAs involve tough and challenging negotiations for ACP countries, which are 
extending over time. The call for ―substantial‖ opening of ACP markets to EU exports is 
facing strong resistance from most ACP countries’ leaders, who understand that a lot is at 
stake and, as such, negotiations must be taken within a reasonable timetable and not under 
the tight deadlines imposed by EU. Only a small number of countries has closed full 
EPAs by the time of writing this dissertation on charges that agreements are falling short 
of their development promise, so interim agreements prevail in most countries. 
Negotiations that were first intended to be conducted between regional blocks, and as 
such bolster the regional integration process, are being replaced by bilateral agreements as 
ACP countries can not reach an agreement regarding the timetable or the list of goods to 
submit to the liberalization scheme portended by EPAs. ACP countries with the lowest 
bargaining power are succumbing to EU’s tight deadlines, negotiating and signing full 
EPAs within a short period of time (as happened with the Caribbean). Negotiations on full 
regional EPAs proceed, after ACP members negotiated individual EPAs, but it remains to 
be seen if these will prove successful as the regional integration process proves puzzling 
(one of the key issues refers to agreement on a CET as there are large differences of 
tariffs amongst ACP countries). EPAs also meet criticism towards EU’s agenda setting, 
whose scope goes, in many cases, far beyond what is proposed at the WTO forum. 
Heterogeneity seems to be the ruling word. 
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A trade liberalization friendly environment marked the last two decades, which 
took the form of tariffs reduction levels worldwide. EPAs came under such liberalisation 
spirit. Still, it is important to acknowledge that tariff reduction has been stronger in 
manufactured goods than in agricultural goods, a trend which worked predominantly to 
the benefit of developed economies (whose comparative advantage was manufactured 
goods production). Trade liberalisation is now moving into services and intellectual 
property rights, current comparative advantages of the developed world, as Sitglitz 
(2006:75-77) notes. Furthermore, efforts on trade liberalization, though bolstered, have 
not reached all areas, as escalating custom duties - “(…) levying higher tariffs on 
processed goods in opposition to on raw materials” (Oxfam, 2006:4) – are been kept 
against developing countries and within our scope of analysis against ACP countries who 
find themselves confined to primary products specialisation and strong commodity 
dependence. Of great importance are non-tariff barriers, which have grown significantly 
over the past years, with RoO and SPS compliance representing particularly demanding 
requirements for ACP countries, which already have to deal with a shortage of human and 
technical capabilities, in addition to supply-side constraints. RoO and SPS are key issues 
for ACP exporters as it makes harder their access to European markets - SPS 
harmonization should be one of the calls of ACP countries in EPAs negotiations, as 
European SPS rank amongst the most demanding, whilst RoO easing should also be 
targeted. 
On this front, it is important to highlight the unfair competition pursued by EU 
which often subsidises its exports but intends to impede ACP countries from protecting 
their exporters through the imposition of tariffs, which actually is the only option they 
have at their disposable given the lack of financial resources to pursue other kind of 
policies and the constraints raised by SAP’s. ACP Governments, NGOs and scholars are 
waiving concerns towards the loss of fiscal revenues EPAs portend for ACP countries, 
given these latter dependence of import fiscal taxes. Though there isn’t a consensus over 
the impact on ACP members’ GDP, both UNECA (2008:37) and Hinkle et al. (2005: 269-
272) suggest ways of softening those losses. 
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The fact that ACP countries are involved in several negotiations roundtables – 
EPAs, WTO forum, own regional integration processes – is also toughening the task. On 
this front it is important to notice that EPAs negotiations are running faster than WTO’s 
roundtable, but the implications from these agreements at the multilateral forum will be 
considerable, and in particular referring to ACP countries’ bargaining position. As such, 
ACP countries should be extra-cautious regarding the content and extension of the 
liberalisation they are willing to carry out under EPAs as these will have consequences in 
their competitive position worldwide in the future - negotiating the biggest possible 
asymmetry should be a target by itself. Careful attention should be paid on negotiations of 
issues of services, investment and intellectual property rights, as WTO’s agreements at 
these levels cap considerably developing world’s future running options. 
EPAs as they were designed and are currently being implemented do not seem to 
work as pro-development tools. Instead, to put development at the centre of EPAs 
negotiations, these agreements should prove more compatible with the regional 
integration process and prioritize it, since this latter is considered a backbone to the 
effective integration of ACP countries into the world economy and the upgrade of their 
competitive position. Development assistance and in particular AfT is an area that needs 
to be bolstered if EPAs intend to succeed in the reduction of poverty incidence in ACP 
countries; it would enable to tackle structural constrains related to supply capacity, 
infrastructure and transports.  
The EU launched a strategy on AfT (squared within WTO’s AfT initiative) which 
did not compromise a new aid envelope or specific delivery mechanisms; as such 
assistance will continue to be channelled though FED. ACP countries and regions should 
keep on calling for higher financial and technical assistance and stronger articulation 
between AfT and EPAs. Furthermore, the delivery of aid relies too much on ―Best-
Endeavour‖ terminology and EU’s AfT Strategy assumes a demand-driven approach. 
This means that recipient countries will have to take the lead and promote initiatives 
identifying trade-related support as a priority, squared within a national development 
strategy, in order to apply for AfT. Lead such proactive role of defining a plan and list 
respective priorities might prove challenging for recipient countries that have to cope with 
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limited technical and human resources, more even if factoring into the deadlock EPAs 
have raised to the regional integration process. Therefore, support should be given to 
those countries/regions where strategies are lacking. 
This dissertation reflected on arguments in favour and against free trade as well as 
upon the relation between protectionism/industry promotion and development. Based on 
the works from Chang, Wade and Amsden reinforces the view that today’s advanced 
economies embraced protectionism policies in the past, in order to climb the ladder of 
development. ACP countries should therefore call on their right to use the same policies 
others countries used in the past, and should strongly expose such views on EPAs 
negotiations - this would enable to turn EPAs into pro-development tools. Significant 
market failures in developing countries suggest that free trade isn’t the best policy option. 
Arguments for infant industry and for temporary and selective protectionism, squared 
within a development strategy, should be revived. These arguments could be introduced 
in EPAs, for instance, within the framework of the sensitive/special products that can be 
eligible and also under the subjectivity that the interpretation of the ―substantial 
liberalisation‖ scheme portends. Last but not least, the empowerment of AU in the context 
of the regional integration process and on EPAs negotiations, as an interlocutor with EU, 
should also yields gains for African countries. 
As Stevens (2008:211) notes the assessment of EPAs total implications could last 
more than a decade. Evidence suggests that full EPAs negotiations will extend over, with 

















STATISTICS ON ACP COUNTRIES 
 
Figure 15: AFRICAN EPAs Country Groups and Customs Unions 
 
Source: World Bank (2008d) 
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Figure 16: AFRICAN EPAs Country Groups in Relation to Existing 
Regional Trade Areas 
 







STATISTICS ON AFRICA’S REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
Table 22: Share of Intra-regional Trade, average for 1996-2005 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2006 (cited in UNECA, 2008b) 
 
Figure 17: Intracommunity Trade as a Share of Total Trade for Selected 
Regional Economic Communities, 1994-2000 (%) 
 




Table 23: Overall Direction of Trade (average percentage of exports and 
imports between 2000 and 2005) 
 
Source: UNECA (2008), compiled from IMF DOT2006, China included in Asia, but separated as a 
memorandum. 
 
Table 24: Integration Indices for Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities, 1995-99 (Index 1994=100) 
 




Table 25: Integration Indices for Africa by Sector, 1995-99 (Index 
1994=100) 
 






STATISTICS ON INFRAESTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT COSTS IN AFRICA 
 
Table 26: Transit Costs in Selected African Countries and World 
Groups, 2001 
 




Table 27: Physical Integration in Selected Regional 
Economic Communities in Africa (2000) 
 






STATISTICS ON AFRICA’S TRADE PERFORMANCE 
 
Table 28: Comparative Merchandise Export Performance, World and Africa, 
2000-2005 (US$ billion) 
 





Figure 18: Regional Growth Performance, 2005-2007 (%) 
 
Source: UN-DESA. UNECA (2008b) 
 
Figure 19: Real GDP Growth in Africa, Oil vs Non-oil Economies 
 




Table 29: Agriculture Share in GDP 
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